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The COVID-19 pandemic sparked social distancing, economic crisis, 
mass layoffs, furloughs, inequality, and civil unrest.  Corporate responses to 
the pandemic have profound effects on employee rights, employees’ role in 
the corporations that they serve, and overall economic activity in the United 
States.  In the last few decades, corporate governance scholarship neglected 
the role of employees—“human capital”—and mainly focused on the 
relationship between directors, managers, and shareholders.  There are calls 
from the public for a revolution in corporate law in the United States, 
mirroring the current social movements that oppose shareholder wealth 
maximization, to resist short-termism and achieve long-term value.  
Corporations are being pressured by institutional investors to incorporate a 
deep obligation to act for the benefit of society at large in their charters, and 
to include employees formally, as stakeholders, in the governance of 
corporations.  Tech employees joined these calls and are revolting by 
organizing, striking, and publicly speaking out against their employers.  Tech 
employees demand that their employers redefine corporate purpose and 
pursue long-term value while using a stakeholder lens.  These developments 
contribute to a “paradigm shift” in thinking about talent management and 
corporate culture.  In 2020, companies finally realized that “shareholder 
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primacy” is not a good business strategy for attracting, engaging, and 
retaining their workforce. 
This Article will address the old but ongoing debate in corporate 
governance theory, from the current dominant shareholder-centric corporate 
governance to collaborative (stakeholder-centric) corporate governance, 
and the new corporate personhood theory.  It answers the question of 
whether our corporate law allows directors to take stakeholder interests into 
account.  It offers a pragmatic solution to the age-old debate on whether 
corporate law allows directors to take stakeholder interests into account by 
arguing that our corporate governance theory can be extended to include the 
protection of directors (or officers) if they take employee interests into 
account in decision-making.  However, this Article also argues that if public 
companies decide to take stakeholder interests into account, then they should 
formally change their charters (or certificates of incorporation).  Moreover, 
and more importantly, they should be required to disclose additional 
information and file periodically with the relevant state and federal 
authorities, akin to Public Benefit Corporations (“PBCs”).  Public 
companies must disclose information on their various efforts to promote their 
public benefit mission and purpose—and the results of such efforts—to their 
shareholders and the public.  Different states have different reporting 
requirements for PBCs, which these companies can easily follow.  There is 
new legislation that was recently passed by the Delaware House of 
Representatives that makes it easier for a traditional corporation to convert 
to a PBC.  With regard to federal authorities, the U.S. Securities and 
Exchange Commission (“SEC”) should move to a prescriptive approach (a 
specific line-item requirement) and require public companies to disclose 
information on talent management.  The SEC must further develop agreed-
upon metrics in order to assess these efforts and the reports on performance 
results. 
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American workers are more educated than ever, more skilled, and 
doing more to create corporate profits than ever, but they have 
shared far less in the fruits of that labor.  To help redress this 
problem, workers must be given more voice within the corporate 
boardroom, and top managers and directors must give greater 
thought to how they treat their employees.  Companies should have 
board-level committees that ensure quality wages and fair worker 
treatment. 
Leo Strine1  
 
[D]isclosure would lead firms to increase human capital 
investment, it should help raise workers’ wages and benefit the 
economy overall. 
Center for American Progress2 
I. INTRODUCTION 
The COVID-19 pandemic is disrupting our way of life and highlighting 
the structural inequalities in our society.  Corporate responses to the 
pandemic have profound effects on employee rights, employees’ role in the 
corporations that they serve, and overall economic activity in the United 
States.  In the last few decades, corporate governance scholarship neglected 
the role of employees—”human capital”—and mainly focused on the 
relationship between directors, managers, and shareholders.  Employees 
around the country are directly affected by the pandemic and millions have 
experienced financial instability, furloughs, and layoffs.  The research, 
statistics, and literature on the impacts of COVID-19 on the U.S. labor market 
are evolving rapidly.  According to the Bureau of Labor Statistics, as of mid-
 
 1. Leo E. Strine, Jr., Toward Fair and Sustainable Capitalism: A Comprehensive Proposal to 
Help American Workers, Restore Fair Gainsharing Between Employees and Shareholders, and 
Increase American Competitiveness by Reorienting Our Corporate Governance System Toward 
Sustainable Long-Term Growth and Encouraging Investments in America’s Future 2 (Univ. of Pa., 
Inst. for L. & Econ., Rsch. Paper No. 19-39, 2019), 
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3461924. 
 2. ANGELA HANKS, ETHAN GURWITZ, BRENDAN V. DUKE & ANDY GREEN, CTR. FOR AM. 
PROGRESS, WORKERS OR WASTE? HOW COMPANIES DISCLOSE—OR DO NOT DISCLOSE— HUMAN 
CAPITAL INVESTMENTS AND WHAT TO DO ABOUT IT 2 (2016), 
https://cdn.americanprogress.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/06/03042031/HumanCapital.pdf. 
  
2020] TIMES THEY ARE A-CHANGIN’ 123 
April 2020, the unemployment rate stands at 14.7% (some studies suggest a 
higher number closer to 20%),3 and more than 36 million U.S. workers have 
filed for unemployment benefits.4 
Despite the fact that unemployment has hit an all-time high in many 
countries across the globe, including the United States, large firms, especially 
ones in the tech industry, are finding that the talent that they need to grow, 
compete, and survive is in short supply.5  In the new “knowledge economy,”6 
companies depend on their talent—employees—to provide the human capital 
that helps the firm grow and compete in this dynamic, complex, and 
everchanging world.  There is a shortage in skilled labor that contributes to a 
“war for talent”7 where large companies, especially tech companies, 
aggressively compete for talent.  As repeat players in competitive markets, 
these companies must establish and maintain a credible reputation in order to 
attract, engage, and retain talent.  Companies that cannot attract, engage, or 
retain talent will not be able to grow and compete. 
All businesses, including tech businesses, have to navigate the 
unprecedented hardships from the COVID-19 pandemic, which resulted in a 
 
 3. See Laura Montenovo, Xuan Jiang, Felipe Lozano Rojas, Ian M. Schmutte, Kosali I. Simon, 
Bruce A. Weinberg & Coady Wing, Determinants of Disparities in COVID-19 Job Losses 1 (Nat’l 
Bureau of Econ. Rsch., Working Paper No. 27132, 2020).  Note that the number can be as much as 
20% according to Shahar Ziv.  Id. (“The fraction of workers who report that they were ‘employed 
but absent’ from work during the CPS reference week grew from 2.5% in February to 7.3% in April.  
If these absent workers are actually unemployed, then the unemployment rate might be closer to 
20%.”). 
 4. Id.  
 5. ERNST & YOUNG, PARADIGM SHIFT: BUILDING A NEW TALENT MANAGEMENT MODEL TO 
BOOST GROWTH 5 (2012), https://www.ey.com/Publication/vwLUAssets/EY-paradigm-
shift/$FILE/EY-paradigm-shift.pdf (“The scarcity of talent is quickly turning out to be the single 
biggest obstacle to growth.  Globally, companies are having trouble filling critical positions – roles 
in which they need people with the advanced skills essential to move the business forward.”). 
 6. See ROBERTO MANGABEIRA UNGER, THE KNOWLEDGE ECONOMY (2019).  Also, Powell 
and Snellman define the knowledge economy as “production and services based on knowledge-
intensive activities that contribute to an accelerated pace of technological and scientific advance as 
well as equally rapid obsolescence.  The key components of a knowledge economy include a greater 
reliance on intellectual capabilities than on physical inputs or natural resources . . . . ”  Walter W. 
Powell & Kaisa Snellman, The Knowledge Economy, 30 ANN. REV. SOCIO. 199, 201 (2004), 
https://scholar.harvard.edu/files/kaisa/files/powell_snellman.pdf. 
 7. See infra notes 77–79 and accompanying text; see, e.g., Anat Alon-Beck, INSIGHT: When 
Unicorn Employees Revolt and Push for IPO, BLOOMBERG (Sept. 30, 2019, 4:01 AM), 
https://news.bloomberglaw.com/securities-law/insight-when-unicorn-employees-revolt-and-push-
for-ipo; Anat Alon-Beck, The Unicorn War for Talent: The Employees Fire Back. WeWork Is the 
Latest Example., FORBES (Jan. 29, 2020, 12:12 PM), 
https://www.forbes.com/sites/anatalonbeck/2020/01/29/the-unicorn-war-for-talent-the-employees-
fire-back-wework-is-the-latest-example/#1f178def35da; Anat Alon-Beck, Unicorn Stock 
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global health and financial crisis.  International organizations8 and global 
institutional investors,9 which comprise public pensions, asset management 
firms, and faith-based funds, are calling on the business community to 
respond to the pandemic responsibly by taking stakeholder interests into 
account when making decisions that affect employees, communities, and the 
markets.10  Tech employees are joining these calls by revolting and 
demanding that their employers step up to the plate, redefine corporate 
purpose, and pursue long-term value while using a stakeholder lens.  They 
want their employers to take into account multiple factors—including health-
care, political, and socio-economic factors—when making business decisions 
that can affect not only their rights but the rights of other stakeholders.11  
There are many examples of companies, such as Facebook, Amazon, Google, 
Salesforce, and Microsoft, that take employee badmouthing and public 
complaints very seriously.12  They do so because such behavior can cause not 
only a reputational damage to the firm, but also higher costs of monitoring 
the labor force.13 
Tech employee activism is not a new phenomenon and has been taking 
place in the past few years.  There are many examples of tech employees, as 
discussed in further detail below, who are putting pressure on decision 
 
 8. See UNITED NATIONS, SHARED RESPONSIBILITY, GLOBAL SOLIDARITY: RESPONDING TO 
THE SOCIO-ECONOMIC IMPACTS OF COVID-19 7 (2020), 
https://unsdg.un.org/sites/default/files/2020-03/SG-Report-Socio-Economic-Impact-of-
Covid19.pdf (“The United Nations calls on all businesses and corporations to take three primary 
actions: a. Adhere to health, safety guidelines and provide economic cushions to workers, including 
through ensuring worker safety and social distancing and secure wages for those working from 
home.  b. Provide financial and technical support to governments by contributing to the COVID-19 
Solidarity Response Fund.  c. Repurpose their facilities and business plans to focus on meeting the 
needs of this crisis.  Some have begun to do so; we need many more to follow in suit.”)  (emphasis 
omitted).  
 9. The Interfaith Center on Corporate Responsibility’s Investor Statement on Coronavirus 
Response was supported by 251 long-term institutional investors representing over $6.4 trillion in 
assets under management with global exposure across capital markets.  INTERFAITH CTR. ON CORP. 
RESP., INVESTOR STATEMENT ON CORONAVIRUS RESPONSE (2020), 
https://www.iccr.org/sites/default/files/page_attachments/investor_statement_on_coronavirus_res
ponse_04.02.2020.pdf.  
 10. See id.; see also Investors Call on Companies to do Their Part to Support Workers and 
Markets During the Coronavirus Crisis, INTERFAITH CTR. ON CORP. RESP. (Mar. 26, 2020), 
https://www.iccr.org/investors-call-companies-do-their-part-support-workers-and-markets-during-
coronavirus-crisis. 
 11. See, e.g., April Glaser, Kickstarter Workers Vote to Form First Union in Tech Industry, 
NBC News (Feb. 18, 2020, 11:07 AM), https://www.nbcnews.com/tech/tech-news/kickstarter-
workers-vote-form-first-union-tech-industry-n1138006; Becca Blazak, The Move Towards 
Stakeholder Capitalism, TechEquity Collaborative (Apr. 30, 2020), 
https://techequitycollaborative.org/2020/04/30/the-move-towards-stakeholder-capitalism/.  
 12. See infra notes 69–72 and accompanying text.  
 13. Anat Alon-Beck, Unicorn Stock Options—Golden Goose or Trojan Horse, 2019 COLUM. 
BUS. L. REV. 107, 118 (2019). 
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makers in their firms to enhance social, environmental, and economic values, 
and to use innovative decision-making methods.14  This recent surge in 
activism, with an embedded social purpose and value creation, is often a 
direct result of a market, government, or even philanthropic organizations’ 
failure to respond to and alleviate social problems.15  Academics, business 
leaders, policymakers, and legislators are grappling with how to respond to 
this relatively new phenomenon.  The shortage in skilled labor and the recent 
public reports on tech employee uprisings are contributing to a “paradigm 
shift”16 in thinking about the purpose of corporate law, talent management, 
and corporate culture.  In 2020, companies finally realized that “shareholder 
primacy” is not a good business strategy for attracting, engaging, and 
retaining their workforce.17  
This Article will address the old but ongoing debate in corporate 
governance theory, from the current dominant shareholder-centric corporate 
governance model, to collaborative (stakeholder-centric) corporate 
governance and the new corporate personhood theory.18  It answers the 
 
 14. Allison Bailey, Vikram Bhalla, Rainer Strack, Diana Dosik & Judy Oh, Organizing for the 
Future with Tech, Talent, and Purpose: Winning the ‘20s, BOS. CONSULTING GRP. (Sept. 16, 2019) 
(“The workforce is changing as well.  Millennials and Generation Z employees are on track to make 
up 59% of the workforce by 2020, according to Manpower Group.  These employees have different 
expectations about engagement and working models—our research shows that 67% of millennials 
expect employers to have purpose and their jobs to have societal impact, and a Gallup study suggests 
that, by 2028, 73% of all teams will have remote workers.”). 
 15. Noam Scheiber & Kate Conger, The Great Google Revolt, N.Y. TIMES MAG. (Feb. 18, 
2020), https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2020/02/18/magazine/google-revolt.html;  
Muzaffar Chishti & Jessica Bolter, “Cubicle Activism”: Companies Face Growing Demands from 
Workers to Cut Ties with ICE and Others in Immigration Arena, MIGRATION POL’Y INST.: POL’Y 
BEAT (Oct. 30, 2019), https://www.migrationpolicy.org/article/cubicle-activism-companies-face-
worker-demands-cut-ties-ice; Kate Mackenzie, Employee Activism Works—Even When It Doesn’t, 
BLOOMBERG (Feb. 26, 2020, 5:00 AM), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2020-02-
26/employee-activism-works-even-when-it-doesn-t. 
 16. ERNST & YOUNG, HOW AND WHY HUMAN CAPITAL DISCLOSURES ARE EVOLVING 1 
(2019), https://assets.ey.com/content/dam/ey-sites/ey-com/en_us/topics/cbm/ey-how-and-why-
human-capital-disclosures-are-evolving.pdf; Steve Klemash, Bridget M. Neill & Jamie C. Smith, 
How and Why Human Capital Disclosures Are Evolving, HARV. L. SCH. F. ON CORP. GOVERNANCE 
(Nov. 15, 2019), https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2019/11/15/how-and-why-human-capital-
disclosures-are-evolving/. 
 17. BUS. ROUNDTABLE, STATEMENT ON THE PURPOSE OF A CORPORATION (2019), 
https://s3.amazonaws.com/brt.org/BRT-StatementonthePurposeofaCorporationOctober2020.pdf 
[hereinafter STATEMENT ON THE PURPOSE OF A CORPORATION]; Maggie Fitzgerald, The CEOs of 
Nearly 200 Companies Just Said Shareholder Value Is No Longer Their Main Objective, CNBC 
(Aug. 19, 2019, 7:38 AM), https://www.cnbc.com/2019/08/19/the-ceos-of-nearly-two-hundred-
companies-say-shareholder-value-is-no-longer-their-main-objective.html; Michael Birshan, 
Madeleine Goerg, Anna Moore & Ellora-Julie Parekh, Investors Remind Business Leaders: 
Governance Matters, MCKINSEY & CO. (Oct. 2, 2020), https://www.mckinsey.com/business-
functions/strategy-and-corporate-finance/our-insights/investors-remind-business-leaders-
governance-matters.  
 18. See infra Part IV.  
  
126 MARYLAND LAW REVIEW [VOL. 80:120 
question of whether our corporate law allows directors to takes stakeholder 
interests into account.  This debate is relevant today as the pandemic shines 
a light on a new movement in corporate law, which calls on companies and 
institutional investors to adopt a new theory of the purpose of the corporation.  
Amongst the movement’s notable spokespeople are Martin Lipton, Colin 
Mayer, and Alex Edmans. 19 
Lipton is a leading American lawyer, who founded the law firm of 
Wachtell, Lipton, Rosen & Katz, and who advocates for companies, asset 
managers, and investors to embrace the principles of his new corporate 
governance framework, The New Paradigm, which takes stakeholder 
interests into account to achieve long-term value and resist short-termism.20  
Mayer is an Oxford Professor who is collaborating with the British 
Academy’s Future of the Corporation Project, and urges for a more radical 
reform.  In his recent book, Prosperity: Better Business Makes the Greater 
Good, Mayer proposes a new theory of the purpose of business: “[t]he 
purpose of business is to produce profitable solutions to the problems of 
people and planet, and in the process it produces profits.”21  Edmans is a 
Professor of Business at Gresham College and Professor of Finance at 
London Business School.  He offers a new financial theory “pieconomics” in 
his book Grow the Pie, which shows that “the most successful companies 
don’t target profit directly but are driven by purpose—the desire to serve a 
societal need and contribute to human betterment.”22 
The Article will introduce this new literature with an emphasis on 
employees as stakeholders.  In the last few decades, U.S. corporate 
governance scholarship neglected the role of employees—“human capital”—
and mainly focused on the relationship between directors, managers, and 
shareholders.  Employees outside the United States have a formal role in 
corporate governance.  In the United States, on the other hand, there is an 
increase in shareholder activism and a decline in worker power (in the form 
of decreased bargaining power).  This Article will contribute to the literature 
by building on the work of Edward Rock and Lynn Stout.   
The focus on corporate governance due to economic crisis is not new.  
Following the 2008 instability and economic crisis, which was caused by 
abuses of large corporations, there was a renewed interest in the corporate 
governance practices of modern corporations and the oversight duties of 
 
 19. See infra Part IV. 
 20. Martin Lipton, It’s Time to Adopt the New Paradigm, HARV. L. SCH. F. ON CORP. 
GOVERNANCE (Feb. 11, 2019), https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2019/02/11/its-time-to-adopt-the-
new-paradigm/. 
 21. COLIN MAYER, PROSPERITY: BETTER BUSINESS MAKES THE GREATER GOOD 39 (2018). 
 22. ALEX EDMANS, GROW THE PIE: HOW GREAT COMPANIES DELIVER BOTH PURPOSE AND 
PROFIT 1 (2020). 
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institutional investors.23  Many countries around the world changed their 
corporate governance codes to take stakeholder interests into account.24 
Unfortunately, in the United States, the change is mostly rhetorical.  
United States business leaders, who are subject to mounting pressures from 
employees and institutional investors, recently adopted the controversial 
Business Roundtable Statement on the Purpose of a Corporation, and even 
included investing in employees as a priority.25  However, as correctly 
pointed out by Harvard Professor Lucian Bebchuck, many of the signatories 
were probably using the statement for public relations purposes (“social 
washing”) without taking any drastic steps to implement their own 
suggestions.26  Despite the statement, the traditional “shareholder primacy” 
view is still very dominant in the United States, as explained in further detail 
below.  
Consequently, twelve years after the last crisis, a slightly different 
question needs to be raised: Do we need to make legal changes to allow firms 
to commit to their employees (stakeholders)?  The question here is not 
whether corporate law mandates concern for stakeholders but rather whether 
it permits it.  As noted, there have been calls by academics, business leaders, 
politicians, and workers for firms to take stakeholder interests into account.27  
 
 23. See Kent Greenfield, The Third Way, 37 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 749, 749 (2014) (“This 
moment has been engendered because of the increasing skepticism the public is showing toward 
corporations and the people who manage them.  The skepticism springs from shocks in the economic 
and political fields that revealed the risks of unbridled corporate power, short-termism, managerial 
opportunism, and shareholder (read Wall Street) supremacy.”). 
 24. See Jill E. Fisch & Steven Davidoff Solomon, Should Corporations Have a Purpose? 101–
02 (Inst. for L. & Econ., Rsch. Paper No. 20-22, 2020), 
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3561164.  The United Kingdom and the 
European Union, as well as other countries around the world, have moved towards a stewardship 
model by legislating stewardship codes, which state social and economic objectives.  Id. at 103 n.10.  
 25. STATEMENT ON THE PURPOSE OF A CORPORATION, supra note 17. 
 26. See Lucian A. Bebchuk & Roberto Tallarita, The Illusory Promise of Stakeholder 
Governance, CORNELL L. REV. (forthcoming Dec. 2020).  Many did not amend their corporate 
governance guidelines following the Business Roundtable statement.  Id. 
 27. See FROM SHAREHOLDER PRIMACY TO STAKEHOLDER CAPITALISM: A POLICY AGENDA 
FOR SYSTEMS CHANGE (2020), https://www.wlrk.com/docs/From-Shareholder-Primacy-to-
Stakeholder-Capitalism-TSC-and-B-Lab-White-Paper.pdf.  This white paper, which was produced 
by non-profit organizations B Lab and The Shareholder Commons, proposes the U.S. push through 
a Stakeholder Capitalism Act.  Id. at 11; see also Frederick Alexander, From Shareholder Primacy 
to Stakeholder Capitalism, HARV. L. SCH. F. ON CORP. GOVERNANCE (Oct. 26, 2020), 
https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2020/10/26/from-shareholder-primacy-to-stakeholder-capitalism/; 
Accountable Capitalism Act, https://www.warren.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/Accountable% 
20Capitalism%20Act%20One-Pager.pdf (last visited Dec. 12, 2020); STATEMENT ON THE PURPOSE 
OF A CORPORATION, supra note 17; Gregory V. Milano, The Return on Purpose: Before and During 
a Crisis, HARV. L. SCH. F. ON CORP. GOVERNANCE (Nov. 9, 2020), 
https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2020/11/09/the-return-on-purpose-before-and-during-a-crisis/; 
Ronald J. Gilson & Curtis J. Milhaup, Shifting Influences on Corporate Governance: Capital 
Market Completeness and Policy Channeling, HARV. L. SCH. F. ON CORP. GOVERNANCE (Nov. 2, 
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This trend will hopefully lead to more empowered workers, increased 
responsibility, and the ability to “grow the pie.”28  But it can also backfire 
and be used and abused by management as a public relations tool, in a way 
that will allow management to continue to control and exploit its workforce.29  
This Article will focus on human capital and corporate governance.  
Traditional corporate law scholars in the United States hold the view that the 
legal relationships between labor, capital, and the firm are very different.30  
Both labor and capital contribute to and invest in the firm; however, capital 
shareholders (or their agents) are the ones who get to decide how the firm is 
to be governed.31  Leading labor law scholars disagree.  For example, Clyde 
Summers postulates: 
[T]he employees who provide the labor are as much members of 
that enterprise as the shareholders who provide the capital.  Indeed, 
the employees may have made a much greater investment in the 
enterprise by their years of service, may have much less ability to 
withdraw, and may have a greater stake in the future of the 
enterprise than many of the stockholders.32 
There is a paradigm shift regarding the role of talent, human capital, and 
culture in corporate governance.  This shift is driven by various influential 
stakeholders, including the Global Reporting Initiative, the Embankment 
Project for Inclusive Capitalism, the Business Roundtable, the Sustainability 
Accounting Standards Board (“SASB”), the U.S. Securities and Exchange 
Commission (“SEC”), and tech workers.33  These groups have identified 
human capital and culture as important parts of a company’s intangible 
assets, which “are now estimated to comprise on average 52% of a company’s 
market value,” according to Ernst & Young.34  These groups are pushing 
 
2020), https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2020/11/02/shifting-influences-on-corporate-governance-
capital-market-completeness-and-policy-channeling/; Edward B. Rock, For Whom is the 
Corporation Managed in 2020?: The Debate Over Corporate Purpose (2020) (unpublished 
manuscript), https://ssrn.com/abstract=3589951. 
 28. EDMANS, supra note 22. 
 29. See Bebchuk & Tallarita, supra note 26. 
 30. See Edward B. Rock & Michael L. Wachter, Tailored Claims and Governance: The Fit 
Between Employees and Shareholders, in EMPLOYEES AND CORPORATE GOVERNANCE (Margaret 
Blair & Mark J. Roe eds., 1999). 
 31. On the intersection of labor and capital as two principal inputs to the firm, see Rock & 
Wachter, supra note 30.  See also Edward B. Rock & Michael L. Wachter, Islands of Conscious 
Power: Law, Norms, and the Self-Governing Corporation, 149 U. PA. L. REV. 1619, 1627 (2001).  
 32. Clyde W. Summers, Codetermination in the United States: A Projection of Problems and 
Potentials, 4 J. COMPAR. CORP. L. & SEC. REGUL. 155, 170 (1982). 
 33. Stephen Klemash, Jennifer Lee & Jamie Smith, Human Capital: Key Findings from a 
Survey of Public Company Directors, HARV. L. SCH. F. ON CORP. GOVERNANCE (May 24, 2020), 
https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2020/05/24/human-capital-key-findings-from-a-survey-of-public-
company-directors/. 
 34. ERNST & YOUNG, supra note 16, at 1.  
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management to modernize corporate decision-making and strategy to foster 
innovation and create long-term value.35  There is a need to understand how 
large companies are managing and measuring human capital.36 
Corporate decisions and responses to this crisis have profound effects 
on employee rights, employees’ role in the corporations that they serve, and 
overall economic activity in the United States.  Working conditions are one 
of the main factors that directly contribute to underlying health conditions of 
individuals and communities.37  The pandemic illuminates the disparities 
between people who are able to work remotely from home and those that find 
it very difficult to do so because of their social and economic conditions.  The 
disparities between people are exacerbated depending on the type of work 
that they perform and the overall policies of their employers.38  Our health is 
directly affected by the ways in which we “live, learn, work, and play.”39  
What if directors (or managers) want to take these factors into account when 
they make decisions about the future of their companies but are concerned 
about their liability if they do?  This Article answers the question of whether 
our corporate law allows directors to take stakeholder interests into account.  
It offers a pragmatic solution to the age-old debate: Our corporate governance 
theory can be extended to include the protection of directors (or officers) if 
they take employee interests into account in decision-making (as long as 
there is no conflict of interest).  
The Article further argues that if public companies decide to take 
stakeholder interests into account, then they should be required to formally 
change their charters (certificates of incorporation).  Moreover, and more 
 
 35. Id.  
 36. For example, the Embankment Project for Inclusive Capitalism (“EPIC”) is a project 
intended “to identify and create new metrics to measure and demonstrate long-term value to 
financial markets.”  COAL. FOR INCLUSIVE CAPITALISM, EMBANKMENT PROJECT FOR INCLUSIVE 
CAPITALISM 4 (2018), https://www.epic-value.com/#report.  EPIC was launched by the Coalition 
for Inclusive Capitalism and Ernst & Young, and participated in by more than thirty asset owners 
(such as Allstate, CalPERS and MetLife), asset managers (like Vanguard, State Street and Fidelity), 
and companies (three of which are in the Top 100 Companies).  Id. 
 37. See Health Equity Considerations & Racial & Ethnic Minority Groups, CTRS. FOR DISEASE 
CONTROL AND PREVENTION (July 24, 2020), https://www.cdc.gov/coronavirus/2019-
ncov/community/health-equity/race-ethnicity.html; see also SHARON BLOCK & BENJAMIN SACHS, 




 38. ELISE GOULD & VALERIE WILSON, ECON. POL’Y INST., BLACK WORKERS FACE TWO OF 
THE MOST LETHAL PREEXISTING CONDITIONS FOR CORONAVIRUS—RACISM AND ECONOMIC 
INEQUALITY (2020), https://www.epi.org/publication/black-workers-covid/; Laura Montenovo, 
Xuan Jiang, Felipe Lozano Rojas, Ian M. Schmutte, Kosali Simon, Bruce A. Weinberg & Coady 
Wing, Unequal Employment Impacts of COVID-19, ECONOFACT (June 1, 2020), 
https://econofact.org/unequal-employment-impacts-of-covid-19. 
 39. Health Equity Considerations & Racial & Ethnic Minority Groups, supra note 37. 
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importantly, they should be required to disclose additional information and 
file periodically with the relevant state and federal authorities, akin to Public 
Benefit Corporations (“PBCs”).  They should be required to disclose to their 
shareholders, and the public, information on their various efforts to promote 
their public benefit mission and purpose, and the results of such efforts.  
Different states have different reporting requirements for PBCs, which these 
companies can easily follow.40  Moreover, there is new legislation that was 
recently passed by the Delaware House of Representatives and signed into 
law on July 16 by Delaware Governor John Carney.  The 2020 amendments 
to the General Corporation Law of the State of Delaware (the “DGCL”) make 
it easier for a traditional corporation to convert to a PBC.41  With regard to 
federal authorities, the SEC should move to a prescriptive approach (a 
specific line-item requirement) and require public companies to disclose 
information on talent management.42  The SEC should further develop 
agreed-upon metrics in order to assess these efforts and the reports on 
performance results.  
The following is an account of the long debate over the theory of the 
firm and the purpose of the corporation.  This Article contributes to the 
literature in two ways: (1) by shedding light on new forms of tech employee 
 
 40. For more on the state by state required public reporting requirements, see Maxime 
Verheyden, Public Reporting by Benefit Corporations: Importance, Compliance, and 
Recommendations, 14 HASTINGS BUS. L.J. 37 (2018). 
 41. The amendments make changes to Delaware PBCs.  For a full analysis of the changes and 
the problems that they are addressing, see Richard Carroll, Chad Davis, Elizabeth Fenton, Alex 
Ferraro, Richard Forsten, Jourdan Garvey, William Gee, Jessica Jones & Pamela Scott, 2020 
Delaware General Corporation Law & Alternative Entity Amendments, JD SUPRA (July 23, 2020), 
https://www.jdsupra.com/legalnews/2020-delaware-general-corporation-law-69690/ (“First, the 
amendments greatly reduce appraisal rights in connection with a conversion to a PBC. . . . .In 
addition, the amendments remove certain super-majority voting provisions that previously applied 
to PBCs. . . . .The amendments eliminate Sections 363(a) and 363(c) thus lowering the thresholds 
to become, or transition away from being, a PBC to the statutory defaults of majority approval 
(unless otherwise stated in a corporation’s certificate of incorporation).  Finally, the amendments 
clarify some lingering concerns regarding director liability in a PBC . . . This has important practical 
implications for directorial exculpation from liability and indemnification.”).  For more analysis, 
see Soyoung Ho, SEC Adopts Disclosure Rule on Human Capital Management, THOMSON 
REUTERS TAX & ACCT. (Aug. 28, 2020), https://tax.thomsonreuters.com/news/sec-adopts-
disclosure-rule-on-human-capital-management/. 
 42. On August 26, 2020, the SEC voted to adopt amendments to modernize the description of 
business (Item 101), legal proceedings (Item 103), and risk factor disclosures (Item 105) that 
registrants are required to make pursuant to Regulation S-K.  The new disclosure rules affect how 
public companies manage their human capital.  It should be noted that the SEC specifically decided 
against the prescriptive approach (under Item 101 of Regulation S-K) and instead the new disclosure 
is based on materiality “to the extent such disclosures would be material to an understanding of the 
registrant’s business.”  Press Release, SEC, SEC Adopts Rule Amendments to Modernize 
Disclosures of Business, Legal Proceedings, and Risk Factors Under Regulation S-K (Aug. 26, 
2020), https://www.sec.gov/news/press-release/2020-192.  See infra Part VIII for more analysis on 
this. 
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activism and the ways in which they affect traditional corporate governance 
practices; and (2) by proposing a simple pragmatic strategic management 
solution to the age-old debate over shareholder versus stakeholder corporate 
governance, by suggesting a focus on disclosure of information to the public.  
The following is an overview of the parts in this Article, and the research 
questions addressed in the respective Parts.   
Part II sheds light on recent tech employee activism.43  Part III provides 
a review of the development of research on the theory of the firm, including 
principal-agent, property rights, and team production.44  Part IV provides a 
review of the long debate over the purpose of the corporation and introduces 
the new personhood theory.45  The purpose of Parts III and IV is to lay the 
foundation to a new proposed suggestion to the old debate over the purpose 
of the corporation model.  They present the historic-doctrinal review of the 
development of theory-of-the-firm research, which is the basis for this 
Article’s theme and discussions, as well as introduce some pioneers who have 
fashioned the theory of the firm research during the past few decades.   
Parts V, VI and VII propose different solutions.46  Part V proposes the 
expansion of director fiduciary duty.47  It asks the question: Where does 
fiduciary duty lie?  Can directors who take actions to maximize the benefit 
of stakeholders, such as employees, enjoy the protections of the business 
judgement rule (“BJR”)?  Part VI deals with the problem of inadequate 
monitoring of public management and proposes to require public companies 
that choose to take stakeholder interests into account to re-incorporate as 
PBCs.48  Part VII proposes to require public companies that choose to take 
stakeholder interests into account to disclose information.49  Part VIII 
concludes that companies that create value for society can also deliver greater 
returns to investors.50  To do so, companies need to invest in their 
stakeholders for the long run.51 
II. TECH EMPLOYEE ACTIVISM 
Why focus our attention on employees?  This Article focuses on the 
employees, the “E” in “EESG,” which stands for Employee, Environmental, 
 
 43. See infra Part II. 
 44. See infra Part III. 
 45. See infra Part IV. 
 46. See infra Parts V–VII. 
 47. See infra Part V. 
 48. See infra Part VI. 
 49. See infra Part VII. 
 50. See infra Part VIII. 
 51. There are many studies on this.  I recommend reading Edmans’s new book for examples on 
companies that are successful in this.  EDMANS, supra note 22. 
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Social, and Governance priorities.52  The term EESG was coined by Leo 
Strine, Jr., the former Chief Justice of the Delaware Supreme Court.53  Strine 
calls on corporate America to take employee interests into account in its 
decision-making.54 
Strine’s suggestions perhaps struck a chord with the business 
community, as evidenced by the recent controversial Business Roundtable 
Statement on the Purpose of a Corporation, which included investing in 
employees as a priority. 55  Unfortunately, as noted above, Bebchuck showed 
in his paper that many companies are probably using the statement as a public 
relations move and have not taken drastic steps to implement their own 
suggestions.56  
So, why do CEOs care about their employees?  Or at least make a public 
statement that they care about them?  The driving forces for the current 
changes in the rhetoric of business leaders (and policymakers) stem from the 
pressure of investors and employees.  This Article will focus on the 
employees.  Tech employees started a revolution and now force the 
management and boards of large tech companies to take their interests and 
opinions into account, as well as the purpose of the corporation, in 
governance, decision-making, and political activity.57  
The recent COVID-19 pandemic expands the disparities between capital 
and labor.  It has profound effects on employee rights and the overall 
economic activity in the United States.58  Unfortunately, the pandemic did 
not spare the tech industry.  Public and private tech employees, working in 
large to small companies, have been affected in ways ranging from changes 
to their work environments to massive layoffs.  Thanks to websites such as 
Layoff.com, which collects data on tech industry cuts, there are reports on 
 
 52. Strine, Jr., supra note 1, at 3. 
 53. Id. 
 54. Id. 
 55. See STATEMENT ON THE PURPOSE OF A CORPORATION, supra note 17. 
 56. See Bebchuk & Tallarita, supra note 26 at 3–4.  Many did not amend their corporate 
governance guidelines following the Business Roundtable statement.  Id. at 25. 
 57. See Anat Alon-Beck, The Facebook Saga: When Tech Employees Revolt, FORBES (July 22, 
2020, 2:24 PM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/anatalonbeck/2020/07/22/the-facebook-saga-when-
tech-employees-revolt/?sh=18021ef56c32; see also Silicon Valley Revolt: Meet the Tech Workers 
Fighting Their Bosses Over Ice, Censorship and Racism (Mar. 29, 2019), 
https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2019/mar/28/tech-workers-silicon-valley-activism; Matt 
Lavietes, Silicon Valley Firms Are Facing a Rise in Anger From a New Source: Their Own 
Employees, CNBC (July 8, 2018, 11:58 AM), https://www.cnbc.com/2018/07/05/tech-ceos-are-
losing-unilateral-power-rapidly-in-a-new-unexpected-way.html. 
 58. World Economic Situation and Prospects: April 2020 Briefing, No. 136, UNITED NATIONS 
(Apr. 1, 2020), https://www.un.org/development/desa/dpad/publication/world-economic-situation-
and-prospects-april-2020-briefing-no-136/. 
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over 80,000 tech employees who lost their jobs.59  Did the fear of layoffs 
stifle tech employee activism?  Surprisingly—no. 
On June 1, 2020, many employees of Facebook, Inc. publicly voiced 
their disagreement with their management’s decision for the first time.  
Specifically, they opposed CEO Mark Zuckerberg’s decision to not remove 
from its platform a post by President Trump on the Floyd protests, which 
followed a week of demonstrations and riots across the country.60  Tech 
employee activism in the form of protest against the employer is not a new 
phenomenon.  It can take several forms and involve governance issues that 
are internal, including employment related conditions (such as pay), or 
external, including social issues, such as ethics concerning development, 
production, or government contracts.  
In the Facebook example, employee activism took two forms: collective 
and individual.61  In the individual context, Facebook employees turned to 
social media platforms and the Internet to publicly disagree with 
Zuckerberg’s inaction.62  There are even reports of some employees who 
went as far as to quit their jobs or call on Zuckerberg to quit his job.63  In the 
collective context, on Monday, June 1, 2020, the employees organized a 
virtual strike against the company.  Zuckerberg controls 57.9% of the voting 
rights on Facebook’s board, but despite this fact, while Zuckerberg and his 
management team took the complaints very seriously, they did not impose 
content restrictions or warnings initially.  Furthermore, the public complaints 
represent a shift in Facebook employees’ expectations, which is evident from 
 
 59. See LAYOFFS TRACKER, https://layoffs.fyi/tracker/ (last visited Dec. 12, 2020).  Layoffs.fyi 
has tracked all tech startup layoffs since the coronavirus was declared a pandemic.  Id.  The data is 
compiled primarily from public reports.  Id.; see also Sarah McBride & Christopher Cannon, Covid-
19 Brings a Reckoning of Layoffs to Silicon Valley, BLOOMBERG (May 28, 2020), 
https://www.bloomberg.com/graphics/2020-coronavirus-technology-layoffs. 
 60. Ryan Mac & Alex Kantrowitz, Tweets, Dissent, and a Walkout: Facebook Employees 
Revolt Over Zuckerberg’s Approach to Trump, BUZZFEED NEWS (June 1, 2020, 6:03 PM), 
https://www.buzzfeednews.com/article/ryanmac/tweets-walkout-facebook-employees-zuckerberg-
trump-protest (“Last Thursday, in addressing protests in Minneapolis, Trump wrote on Twitter and 
Facebook that ‘when the looting starts, the shooting starts,’ a historically charged phrase that 
suggested that violent action would be taken against protesters.”). 
 61. Freshfields Bruckhaus Deringer LLP, Employee Activism in the Tech Industry, LEXOLOGY 
(Feb. 7, 2020), https://www.lexology.com/library/detail.aspx?g=7b9aa959-64ef-46de-a969-
c1abed649d22. 
 62. Sheera Frenkel, Mike Isaac, Cecilia Kang & Gabriel J.X. Dance, Facebook Employees 
Stage Virtual Walkout to Protest Trump Posts, N.Y. TIMES (June 1, 2020), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2020/06/01/technology/facebook-employee-protest-trump.html. 
 63. Donie O’Sullivan, Exclusive: He Quit His Facebook Job Because of Zuckerberg’s Inaction 
on Trump’s Posts, CNN (June 5, 2020, 6:32 AM), 
https://www.cnn.com/2020/06/05/business/facebook-employee-resigns/index.html. 
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the employees disparaging their employer and making public complaints.64  
These actions cause not only reputational damage to Facebook as an 
employer, but also impose higher costs for the firm in monitoring its labor 
force.65 
On June 6, 2020, scientists funded by the Chan Zuckerberg Initiative 
(“CZI”) sent a letter criticizing Zuckerberg and “Facebook’s role in diffusing 
inaccurate information”; some even called for Zuckerberg to resign.66  
Facebook’s decision was in contrast to the decision of another social media 
platform and rival—Twitter.  Twitter’s management responded to employee 
activism differently by placing a warning label on President Trump’s tweet, 
which included the same message as his post on Facebook.  On June 17, 2020, 
a few weeks after the public employee revolt, civil rights activists—a 
coalition consisting of Color Of Change, NAACP, ADL, Sleeping Giants, 
Free Press, and Common Sense Media —joined the revolution and started a 
campaign against Facebook called “Stop Hate for Profit.”67  The Stop Hate 
for Profit campaign persuaded many of Facebook’s advertisers to boycott the 
company and stop spending advertising money on Facebook and Instagram.68  
Large companies joined the campaign and included The North Face (the 
first to join), REI, Patagonia, Unilever, Verizon, and more.  This campaign 
managed to hurt Facebook’s reputation and financial interests.  Facebook’s 
stock dropped more than 7% after Unilever announced that it would no longer 
advertise on the platform, stating that “[c]ontinuing to advertise on these 
 
 64. Judith Samuelson, Why Do We Still Call It Capitalism?, QUARTZ AT WORK (Apr. 9, 2018), 
https://work.qz.com/1247835/spotifys-ipo-should-make-us-consider-why-we-still-use-the-term-
capitalism/. 
 65. For more on private tech companies and unicorn employee activism, see generally Alon-
Beck, supra note 13.  See Vladimir Atanasov, Vladimir Ivanov & Kate Litvak, The Impact of 
Litigation on Venture Capitalist Reputation 2–3 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Rsch., Working Paper No. 
13641, 2007), http://www.nber.org/papers/w13641.  For more on agency costs and reputation, see 
Eugene F. Fama, Agency Problems and the Theory of the Firm, 88 J. POL. ECON. 288 (1980).  
 66. COLLECTIVE ACTION IN TECH, https://collectiveaction.tech (last visited June 30, 2020). 
 67. See STOP HATE FOR PROFIT, ’https://www.stophateforprofit.org/demand-change (last 
visited June 30, 2020).  See also Afdhel Aziz, Facebook Ad Boycott Campaign ‘Stop Hate for Profit’ 
Gathers Momentum and Scale: Inside the Movement for Change, FORBES (June 24, 2020, 10:35 
AM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/afdhelaziz/2020/06/24/facebook-ad-boycott-campaign-stop-
hate-for-profit-gathers-momentum-and-scale-inside-the-movement-for-change/#6110d2a16687. 
 68. The Color of Change website states: “From the monetization of hate speech to 
discrimination in their algorithms to the proliferation of voter suppression to the silencing of Black 
voices, Facebook has refused to take responsibility for hate, bias, and discrimination growing on 
their platforms.  And what has allowed Facebook to continue racist practices is the $70B of revenue 
from corporations every year.  Companies have a choice to make about whether they want their 
businesses featured on Facebook’s platforms side-by-side with racist attacks on Black people.”  
Calling on Facebook Corporate Advertisers to Pause Ads for July 2020, COLOR OF CHANGE (June 
19, 2020), https://colorofchange.org/stop-hate-for-profit/. 
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platforms at this time would not add value to people and society.”69  
Therefore, it is not surprising that on June 26, 2020, Zuckerberg caved to the 
mounting public and economic pressure, despite his fears of regulation by the 
government, and announced new policies.  Facebook’s employees won the 
battle.  
Twitter and Facebook are not alone.  Since 2018, Amazon,70 Google,71 
Microsoft,72 Salesforce73 and other tech giants have also dealt with employee 
activism, in which the companies have been asked to alter their dealings with 
the federal government and cancel government contracts due to ethical, geo-
political concerns and the purpose of their corporation.  These cases highlight 
the fact that tech employees have the power to change the status quo. 
It is not surprising that tech employees are the ones leading by activism.  
They are turning their attention to their employers—large corporations and 
the managers who manage them.  They are calling on their employers to take 
corporate social responsibility into account.  Perhaps they will be able to do 
what policymakers, academics, and leading lawyers were not able to do, and 
that is to change our current corporate law to mirror social movements, to 
take stakeholder interests into account, to resist short-termism, and to achieve 
long-term value by forcing their employers to incorporate in their charters a 
deep obligation to act for the benefit of society at large.  
A. Tech Employees vs. Non-Tech Employees  
Tech employees are different than employees in other industries for the 
following reasons.  First, our economy is based on knowledge and, as such, 
it relies on intangible assets, which are comprised of brain power.  As stated 
 
 69. Jon Swartz, Facebook Reverses Policies as Ad Boycott Sends Stock Down, MARKETWATCH 
(June 28, 2020, 2:41 PM), https://www.marketwatch.com/story/facebook-shares-drop-7-as-
unilever-halts-advertising-prompting-changes-at-social-networking-giant-2020-06-
26?mod=investing. 
 70. See Ali Breland, Trump Era Ramps Up Tech Worker Revolt, HILL (June 30, 2018, 6:27 
PM), https://thehill.com/policy/technology/394597-trump-era-ramps-up-tech-worker-revolt (“At 
Amazon, workers banded together to oppose the company selling its facial recognition software to 
law enforcement agencies out of fears the technology could harm marginalized communities.”). 
 71. See id. (“Google said it would not renew its Project Maven contract with the Pentagon, 
reportedly because of pressure from employees.”).  
 72. See id. (“Microsoft employees are pushing CEO Satya Nadella to drop the company’s 
contract with Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) in protest over the agency separating 
children from families caught crossing the southern border illegally.”).  Also, on June 8, 2020, 
Microsoft employees used a Facebook group—”Young Microsoft FTEs”—to revolt against 
Microsoft.  COLLECTIVE ACTION IN TECH., supra note 66.  The Tech Workers Coalition reported 
that “Hundreds of Microsoft employees have signed a letter to the company’s top executives asking 
for Microsoft to take action in the wake of national protests.”  Id. 
 73. See Breland, supra note 70 (“Salesforce workers earlier this week penned their own letter to 
CEO Marc Benioff urging him to review its contract with Customs and Border Protection, also out 
of concern with the administration’s family separation policy.”).  
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by Colin Mayer in his new book, Prosperity: Better Business Makes the 
Greater Good: 
Over the last forty years there has been a remarkable 
transformation in the corporation.  Forty years ago, 80 per cent of 
the market value of US corporations was attributed to tangible 
assets—plant, machinery, and buildings—as against intangibles—
licenses, patents, and research development.  Today, intangible 
assets account for 85 per cent of the market value of US 
corporations.74  
Second, tech employees are highly educated, trained and paid.  
According to the labor market analysis, when employees receive specific 
training, they are very valuable to the firm, and turnover is very costly.75  
There are similarly qualified, but less experienced, employees who would 
have to acquire the requisite skills before they can reach the level of the 
employee that left the firm.  Therefore, employment contracts with tech 
employees are designed as long-term contracts to prevent their departure.76 
Third, U.S. tech companies are engaged in a war for talent,77 where they 
experience difficulty with attracting, engaging, and retaining talent.78  
Retaining talent and preventing “leakage from firm knowledge resources to 
other competitors” is therefore incredibly important to the employer firm.  
High-tech firms can control knowledge hazards by adopting stock option 
plans. According to Gorga and Halberstam, in general, startup tech firms use 
equity compensation to avoid the high costs associated with employee 
turnover and prevent the negative effect that high employee turnover has on 
company morale.79 
Finally, tech employees are usually also equity holders (shareholders) 
in their firm, as I explain in my paper, Unicorn Stock Options.80  Employee 
option grants made it possible for employees to participate in the growth of 
the business without having to put significant amounts of capital at risk to 
 
 74. MAYER, supra note 21, at 31. 
 75.  See Oliver E. Williamson, Michael L. Wachter & Jeffrey E. Harris, Understanding the 
Employment Relation: The Analysis of Idiosyncratic Exchange, 6 BELL J. ECON. 250, 253 (1975).  
 76. Id. 
 77. See Elizabeth G. Chambers, Mark Foulon, Helen Handfield-Jones, Steven M. Hankin & 
Edward G. Michaels III, The War for Talent, 3 MCKINSEY Q. 44, 46 (1998).  Chambers et al. coined 
the term “war for talent.”  Id. at 44; see also Shira Ovide, Honey, I Shrunk Apple’s Profit Margins, 
BLOOMBERG OP. (Aug. 2, 2018, 12:06 PM), https://www.bloomberg.com/opinion/articles/2018-
08-02/apple-aapl-at-1-trillion-honey-i-shrunk-the-profit-margins.  
 78. See Chambers et al., supra note 77, at 46–47; see also Amir Efrati & Peter Schulz, How 
Tech Firms Stack Up on Pay, THE INFORMATION (Sept. 13, 2016, 12:45 PM), 
https://www.theinformation.com/articles/how-tech-firms-stack-up-on-pay.  
 79. See Érica Gorga & Michael Halberstam, Knowledge Inputs, Legal Institutions and Firm 
Structure: Towards a Knowledge-Based Theory of the Firm, 101 NW. U. L. REV. 1123, 1185, 1192 
(2007).  
 80. Alon-Beck, supra note 13, at 136. 
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pay the ordinary income tax that otherwise would be immediately due on the 
additional cash compensation needed to win the war for talent.81  This 
mechanism became popular due to the recognition that employee equity-
sharing improves overall firm productivity, shareholder returns, and profit 
levels.82 
The practice of giving startup employees equity (share-ownership) and 
the promise of equity (options) in order to attract, engage, and retain talent is 
very important.  It improves overall company performance and allows the 
employees in the firm, who contributed their sweat equity—“human 
capital”—to benefit from the gains of the firm’s success following an IPO.  
The issue of equity compensation is very relevant to the stakeholder 
capitalism debate.  Some stakeholder theory scholars believe that we need to 
reform the pay structures of public companies by providing broad-based 
equity compensation to all employees, which will contribute to better firm 
performance.83 
According to Edmans, broad-based employee share compensation can 
benefit society in a way that grows the pie.84  Edmans suggests that we do not 
cut the CEO’s pay and redistribute it to others in the company (which will 
split the pie differently), but rather give the CEO incentives to grow the pie 
and create long-term value by investing in stakeholders.85  Edmans postulates 
that, “while growing the pie is important, the division must also be fair.86  If 
the firm succeeds, it’s not just down to the CEO—workers contributed 
substantially also.  If they are given shares, they’ll benefit from a larger pie, 
rather than all the gains going to executives.”87  But, unfortunately, in other 
industries in the United States, not only do employees not get any equity but 
according to a recent study by Stansbury and Summers, there is a decline in 
 
 81. In order to attract labor to Silicon Valley, startups used stock option plans.  See William 
Lazonick, The Financialization of the U.S. Corporation: What Has Been Lost, and How It Can Be 
Regained, 36 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 857, 865 (2013); see also WILLIAM LAZONICK, SUSTAINABLE 
PROSPERITY IN THE NEW ECONOMY? BUSINESS ORGANIZATIONS AND HIGH-TECH EMPLOYMENT 
IN THE UNITED STATES 39–79 (2009) (discussing the Cisco example). 
 82. See Saul Levmore, Puzzling Stock Options and Compensation Norms, 149 U. PA. L. REV. 
1901, 1901 (2001) (“These options could take many forms, but there is remarkable conformity in 
the practice of giving a class of employees a large percentage of compensation . . . . . .in the form 
of options . . . .”); see also Thomas A. Smith, The Zynga Clawback: Shoring Up the Central Pillar 
of Innovation, 53 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 577, 589–606 (2013) (discussing at-will contracts and 
equity compensation). 
 83. Alex Edmans, Xavier Gabaix & Dirk Jenter, Executive Compensation: A Survey of Theory 
and Evidence (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Rsch., Working Paper No. 23596, 2017), 
https://www.nber.org/system/files/working_papers/w23596/w23596.pdf 
 84. EDMANS, supra note 22. 
 85. Id. 
 86. Id. 
 87. See id. at 39–40.  
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overall worker power.88  They postulate that the decline started in the 1980s 
and that the following three factors contributed to it: 
First, institutional changes: the policy environment has become 
less supportive of worker power by reducing the incidence of 
unionism and the credibility of the “threat effect” of unionism or 
other organized labor, and the real value of the minimum wage has 
fallen.  Second, changes within firms: the increase in shareholder 
power and shareholder activism has led to pressures on companies 
to cut labor costs, resulting in wage reductions within firms and the 
“fissuring” of the workplace as companies increasingly outsource 
and subcontract labor.  And third, changes in economic conditions: 
increased competition for labor from technology or from low-wage 
countries has increased the elasticity of demand for U.S. labor, or, 
in the parlance of bargaining theory, has improved employers’ 
outside option.89 
Therefore, the enigma continues: Can the revolt by tech employees lead 
to a shift in the prevalent corporate governance theory from current 
shareholder-centric corporate governance to collaborative (stakeholder-
centric) corporate governance model?  Maybe time will tell.  But one thing 
is clear: Tech workers are accumulating power by organizing, unionizing, 
and forming tech cooperatives.90  Their activism concerns various issues, 
including external social and ethical considerations regarding investment, 
development, production, and manufacturing.  This activism contributed to a 
paradigm shift in thinking about talent management and corporate culture.  
As noted above, in 2020, CEOs realized that they needed to take their talent 
seriously.  Therefore, shareholder primacy is not a good business strategy for 
attracting, engaging, and retaining their workforce. 
The following is a discussion on the purpose of the corporation and the 
challenges associated with calls for change. 
III. THEORY OF THE FIRM  
On June 24, 2020, at 9:00 AM EST, like many young corporate law 
scholars around the United States, I eagerly watched an online debate called 
“Stakeholder versus Shareholder Capitalism: The Great Debate” between 
Oxford Professor Colin Mayer and Harvard Professor Lucian Bebchuck.91  It 
 
 88. Anna Stansbury & Lawrence H. Summers, The Declining Worker Power Hypothesis: An 
Explanation for the Recent Evolution of the American Economy 1 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Rsch., 
Working Paper No. 27193, 2020), https://www.nber.org/papers/w27193. 
 89. Id. at 2–3. 
 90. See supra notes 71–73 and accompanying text.  
 91. University of Oxford, Saïd Business School, Stakeholder Versus Shareholder Capitalism: 
The Great Debate, YOUTUBE (June 25, 2020), https://www.youtube.com/ 
watch?v=cUpyL1zVF50&feature=emb_title. 
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was indeed a great debate.  The debate illustrated the differences between 
U.S. and UK corporate thinking on the theory of the firm and the purpose of 
the corporation.  
Since the end of the twentieth century,92 the views of Milton Friedman93 
and Michael Jensen94 have become popular in the United States for using 
shareholder primacy as a corporate governance model.95  These theories 
mandate that management of large public firms maximize managerial 
opportunism, “shareholder (read Wall Street) supremacy” and short-
termism.96  Therefore, management cannot realistically pursue long-term 
projects, such as research and development, because such projects cannot 
produce instant financial returns to the shareholders.97   
Moreover, stakeholder scholars criticize shareholder scholars98 for 
advocating for shareholder primacy, which centers solely on the interests of 
shareholders as the “sole residual claimants” and “owners” of the 
corporations, ignoring all the other stakeholders.99  They further suggest that 
 
 92. See Lynn A. Stout, The Corporation as a Time Machine: Intergenerational Equity, 
Intergenerational Efficiency, and the Corporate Form, 38 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 685, 711 (2015) 
(“Toward the end of the twentieth century, however, American public companies began to change.  
The shift began in academia with the rise of the Chicago School of free market economists.  
Influential economic thinkers like Milton Friedman and Michael Jensen, apparently viewing the 
public corporation rather like a gigantic sole proprietorship, argued that the absence of shareholder 
power in public companies noted by Berle and Means was a problem to be solved rather than a 
deliberate legal strategy to achieve asset lock-in.”) (citation omitted)); see also, e.g., Henry 
Hansmann & Reinier Kraakman, What is Corporate Law? in THE ANATOMY OF CORPORATE LAW: 
A FUNCTIONAL AND COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS (2004). 
 93. See generally Milton Friedman, A Friedman Doctrine— The Social Responsibility of 
Business Is to Increase its Profits, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 13, 1970), 
https://www.nytimes.com/1970/09/13/archives/a-friedman-doctrine-the-social-responsibility-of-
business-is-to.html (publishing under the name Fulton Friedman); see also LYNN STOUT, THE 
SHAREHOLDER VALUE MYTH: HOW PUTTING SHAREHOLDERS FIRST HARMS INVESTORS, 
CORPORATIONS, AND THE PUBLIC 18 (2012).  
 94. See generally Michael C. Jensen & William H. Meckling, Theory of the Firm: Managerial 
Behavior, Agency Cost and Ownership Structure, 3 J. FIN. ECON. 305 (1976); see also STOUT, supra 
note 93, at 18.  
 95. See also Henry Hansmann & Reinier Kraakman, The End of History of Corporate Law, 89 
GEO. L.J. 439, 440–41 (2001). 
 96. See Greenfield, supra note 23, at 749; Hansmann & Kraakman, supra note 92, at 712 n.88 
(“[T]his assumption is tantamount to assuming that shareholders act like psychopaths who are 
indifferent to the consequences that their investing decisions impose on others.”); Stout, supra note 
92, at 711–12 (maximizing “shareholder value” means maximizing the increase of share price and 
dividends).  
 97. See Stout, supra note 92, at 712.  
 98. See Stout, supra note 92, at 711. 
 99. Id. at 711 n.87 (“Rather than owning corporations, shareholders own shares, which are a 
contract with the corporate entity.  Similarly, the corporate entity is its own residual claimant.  While 
the idea of shareholder ‘ownership’ of the firm might be forgiven as a convenient and harmless 
metaphor when describing a company with a controlling shareholder, it is grossly misleading when 
applied to a board-controlled company.”) (citation omitted). 
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investors focus on short-term results due to their emphasis on stock market 
liquidity.100  In the words of Lynn Stout, “shareholder value thinking had 
replaced managerialism as the dominant business philosophy in public 
corporations.”101 
That is why stakeholder scholars from around the world are calling for 
a radical change in the theory and philosophy of current corporate 
governance theory.102  The corporate patterns and theories that we observe 
today are not merely products and consequences of the technology or 
development narratives, but lie in politics and economic philosophy as 
well.103  Therefore, one of the goals of this Article is to touch on 
managerialism, which is supposed to allow boards of directors to plan for a 
long-term strategy of growth to benefit society as a whole.104  
Before diving into the different theories of why firms exist, it must be 
noted that the UK recently changed its corporate governance code effective 
January 1, 2019.105  The changes were meant to restore public trust in UK 
 
 100. See COLIN MAYER, FIRM COMMITMENT: WHY THE CORPORATION IS FAILING US AND 
HOW TO RESTORE TRUST IN IT (2013); STOUT, supra note 93, at 16–18 (“The short-term focus of 
investors and corporate boards is currently one of the key issues in the corporate governance 
debate.”); Ira M. Millstein, Re-examining Board Priorities in an Era of Activism, CLS BLUE SKY 
BLOG (Mar. 11, 2013), https://clsbluesky.law.columbia.edu/author/ira-m-millstein/ (“[C]orporate 
boards around the country should re-examine their priorities and figure out to whom they owe their 
fiduciary duties.. . . . Some activists are using their newfound power to sway and bully management 
to focus on the short term, meet the quarterly targets and disgorge cash in extra dividends or stock 
buy backs in lieu of investing in long-term growth.”).  Therefore, it is not surprising that recent 
empirical research already shows that even profitable technology companies these days increasingly 
prefer to stay private as long as possible in order to avoid the pressures of short-term strategies that 
result from public ownership.  See Rival Versions of Capitalism: The Endangered Public Company, 
ECONOMIST (May 19, 2012), http://www.economist.com/node/21555562; Joann S. Lublin & 
Spencer E. Ante, A Fight in Silicon Valley: Founders Push for Control, WALL ST. J. (July 11, 2012, 
11:50 AM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424052702303292204577519134168240996.  
 101. See Stout, supra note 92, at 713.  Stout also refers to the work of corporate scholar Edward 
Rock, who stated that “[m]anagers now largely think and act like shareholders.”  Id. (quoting 
Edward B. Rock, Adapting to the New Shareholder-Centric Reality, 161 U. PA. L. REV. 1907, 1988 
(2013)).  
 102. The initiative is led by Professors Lynn Stout and Margaret Blair.  See STOUT, supra note 
93; Greenfield, supra note 23, at 749; see also Kent Greenfield, The Stakeholder Strategy, 26 
DEMOCRACY 47, 48 (2012).  
 103. An examination of classic corporate governance theory will demonstrate that “the public 
corporation is as much a political adaptation as an economic or technological necessity.”  Mark J. 
Roe, A Political Theory of American Corporate Finance, 91 COLUM. L. REV. 10, 10 (1991).  
 104. See Anat Alon-Beck, The Coalition Model, a Private-Public Strategic Innovation Policy 
Model for Encouraging Entrepreneurship and Economic Growth in the Era of New Economic 
Challenges, 17 WASH. U. GLOB. STUD. L. REV. 267 (2018). 
 105. FIN. REPORTING COUNCIL, THE UK CORPORATE GOVERNANCE CODE (2018), 
https://www.frc.org.uk/directors/corporate-governance-and-stewardship/uk-corporate-governance-
code (effective for accounting periods beginning on or after Jan. 1., 2019). 
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businesses and to focus on the purpose of the corporation.106  Additionally, 
the British Academy started a large and ambitious project—the “Future of 
the Corporation”—that concludes “the purpose of business is to solve the 
problems of people and planet profitably, and not profit from causing 
problems.”107 
One of the most outspoken voices is that of Colin Mayer, who postulates 
that “constraining the firm to a single narrow objective has had wide-ranging 
and damaging consequences: economic, environmental, political, and 
social.”108  He further states that “it is only once one has defined a company’s 
purposes that one can ascertain either its appropriate structure and conduct or 
its performance.”109  He rejects the view that regulation is an appropriate 
response to firm misbehavior.  He rather mainly relies on a firm’s 
commitment to corporate purpose.  
Critics of Mayer’s view point out that we cannot put “too much faith in 
private ordering proclamations of a ‘corporate purpose’ or of a set of values.”  
If we give too much discretion to executives to take stakeholder interests into 
account, we run into the risk of enhancing their powers and insulating them 
from oversight and criticism, while diminishing the need for regulations.110 
Another popular view is that of Alex Edmans, who postulates that 
“companies can create both profit and social value.”111  Edmans advocates 
for using the new theory of his pieconomics, which is an approach to business 
that “seeks to create profits only through creating value for society.”112  
Edmans further states that pieconomics “doesn’t imply unfettered pursuit of 
 
 106. The New Code principles are on: (1) alignment of company purpose, strategy, values and 
corporate culture; (2) effective engagement with shareholders and stakeholders; (3) responsibilities 
of the board to ensure that workforce policies and practices are consistent with the company’s values 
and support its long-term sustainable success; (4) consideration of the length of service of the board 
as a whole and the need for regular board refreshment; and (5) alignment of remuneration and 
workforce policies to the long-term success of the company and its values.  Id.  The New Code 
provisions are on: (1) the board’s role in monitoring and assessing culture; (2) mechanisms for 
gathering the views of the workforce; (3) reporting on how stakeholder interests, and the other 
matters set out in section 172, have influenced the board’s decision-making; (4) succession planning 
and board member contribution; (5) diversity and inclusion; (6) the length of tenure of the chair; (7) 
board responsibility for identifying and assessing emerging risks (in addition to the principal risks); 
(8) holding periods for long-term incentive schemes; and (9) pension arrangements.  Id. 
 107. THE BRITISH ACAD., PRINCIPLES FOR PURPOSEFUL BUSINESS: HOW TO DELIVER THE 
FRAMEWORK FOR THE FUTURE OF THE CORPORATION 8 (2019), 
https://www.thebritishacademy.ac.uk/documents/224/future-of-the-corporation-principles-
purposeful-business.pdf. 
 108.  See MAYER, supra note 21, at 34.  
 109. See MAYER, supra note 21, at 7.  
 110. Marco Ventoruzzo, On ‘Prosperity’ by Colin Mayer: Brief Critical Remarks on the (Legal) 
Relevance of Announcing a Multi-Stakeholders ‘Corporate Purpose’ 10 (Bocconi Legal Stud. 
Research Paper No. 3546139, 2020), https://ssrn.com/abstract=3546139. 
 111. See EDMANS, supra note 22, at 3.  
 112. See EDMANS, supra note 22, at 3.  
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social goals, cheerfully ignoring profits.”113  Edmans understands the agency 
cost problems and the potential for abuse.   
The following is an overview of three competing theories that attempt 
to explain why firms exist.  My suggestion works best when understanding 
the normative foundations and analysis of the team production approach.  
There are many competing economic theories that try to explain why firms 
exist.114  The main three theories are the principal-agent approach,115 property 
rights approach,116 and team production approach.117  
The principal-agent and property rights approaches are highlighted 
extensively in current economics and law writings.118  However, according 
to scholars Blair and Stout, when these theories are applied to public firms, 
they are lacking.119  Therefore, there is a need to center on the team 
production approach.120   
 
 113.   See EDMANS, supra note 22, at 31. 
 114. See, e.g., R.H. Coase, The Nature of the Firm, 4 ECONOMICA 386, 390 (1937); Charles R.T. 
O’Kelley, Coase, Knight, and the Nexus-of-Contracts Theory of the Firm: A Reflection on 
Reification, Reality, and the Corporation as Entrepreneur Surrogate, 35 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 1247, 
1250 (2012) (“[C]oase . . . saw the firm as having an ‘inside’ and an ‘outside’ and a distinct central 
actor—the entrepreneur. . . . Coase looked inside the firm and identified the entrepreneur as the 
central economic actor; it was the entrepreneur who consciously allocated resources within the firm 
by command.”); Margaret M. Blair & Lynn A. Stout, A Team Production Theory of Corporate Law, 
85 VA. L. REV. 247, 257 n.19 (1999) (“Coase answered that a key feature of production in a firm is 
a ‘hierarchical’ structure under which an entrepreneur who needs to acquire materials and services 
retains the right to direct the exact details of what and how products or services are delivered.  A 
firm, therefore, consists of the systems of relationships which come into existence ‘[when] the 
direction of resources . . . becomes dependent on the buyer.’  Firms emerge, Coase speculated, when 
it would be too costly and complicated to write contracts that give the buyer of the product or 
services the necessary degree of control.  Coase’s analysis focuses on why entrepreneurial firms 
exist. . . . Coase’s entrepreneur could solve her problem (the need to direct or control the product or 
service she is buying) using separate employment contracts between the entrepreneur and each 
employee. Hence Coase’s theory of the ‘firm’ does not tell us why ‘corporations’ are needed.”) 
(citations omitted).  
 115. See Blair & Stout, supra note 114, at 257–58 (noting that this approach “explores 
contracting problems that arise when one actor hires another to act on her behalf”). 
 116. See id. at 258 (observing that this path “examines problems associated with coordinating 
productive activities where it is too costly to write and enforce complete contracts, focusing 
especially on the role played by property rights as a solution for closing contractual gaps”). 
 117. See id. (noting that this path “considers the role hierarchy may play in policing against 
shirking problems that may arise in coordinating team production”).  
 118. See, e.g., id.  
 119. Id.  
 120. Id.  
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A. Principal-Agent 
Agency problems are viewed today as the main issue that corporate law 
scholarship has to resolve.121  Contemporary scholars122 use agency law to 
explain the notion that the corporation is comprised of collections of assets 
that are jointly owned by principals (shareholders), who hire agents (directors 
and officers) to manage the corporation’s assets on their behalf.123  They 
further contend that the shareholders are powerless because shareholders do 
not have the same knowledge of the firm’s operations as managers do.  The 
managers, therefore, always have the potential for exercising abusive 
behavior such as cheating, mismanaging, and stealing from the shareholders.  
According to legal scholar Frank Easterbrook, “[e]ven when they do not, the 
potential of misconduct remains.”124 
The Agency solution to such problems is to give shareholders powers 
over directors, such as allowing shareholders to remove boards that do not 
perform according to shareholder expectations, or strapping executive pay to 
shareholder profits.125  
 
 121. See Stout, supra note 92, at 705 (“Indeed, a casual reader could be forgiven for concluding 
that the only problem posed by corporate entities is the challenge of eliminating the waste that results 
when corporate managers fail to run firms in an optimal fashion (usually assumed to be a profit-
maximizing fashion).”); see also Edward B. Rock, Adapting to the New Shareholder-Centric 
Reality, 161 U. PA. L. REV. 1907, 1909–10 (recounting the ways in which agency costs are viewed 
as “the central problem of U.S. corporate law”). 
 122. The subsequent are examples of scholars who utilize the principal-agent model.  In legal 
theory, see FRANK H. EASTERBROOK & DANIEL R. FISCHEL, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF 
CORPORATE LAW (1991), and Lucian Arye Bebchuck, Federalism and the Corporation: The 
Desirable Limits on State Competition in Corporate Law, 105 HARV. L. REV. 1435 (1992).  In 
economics, see Eugene F. Fama, Agency Problems and the Theory of the Firm, 88 J. POL. ECON. 
288, 289 (1980) (“The firm is viewed as a set of contracts among factors of production, with each 
factor motivated by its self-interest. . . . In the classical theory, the agent who personifies the firm is 
the entrepreneur who is taken to be both manager and residual risk bearer. . . . The main thesis of 
this paper is that separation of security ownership and control can be explained as an efficient form 
of economic organization within the ‘set of contracts’ perspective.”). 
 123. See Blair & Stout, supra note 114; Jensen & Meckling, supra note 94.  
 124. See EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 122, at 1. 
 125. See, e.g., Lucian Bebchuk, The Myth of the Shareholder Franchise, 93 VA. L. REV. 675, 
700 (2007) (arguing that shareholders should have added powers to remove boards of directors); 
see LUCIAN BEBCHUK & JESSE FRIED, PAY WITHOUT PERFORMANCE: THE UNFULFILLED PROMISE 
OF EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION (2004) (arguing that shareholder returns should be tied to executive 
pay); See Lucian Arye Bebchuck, The Case for Increasing Shareholder Power, 118 HARV. L. REV. 
833, 835 (2005) (“[A]s part of their power to amend governance arrangements, shareholders should 
be able to adopt provisions that would give them subsequently a specified power to intervene in 
additional corporate decisions.  Power to intervene in game-ending decisions (to merge, sell all 
assets, or dissolve) could address management’s bias in favor of the company’s continued existence.  
Power to intervene in scaling-down decisions (to make cash or in-kind distributions) could address 
management’s tendency to retain excessive funds and engage in empire-building.  Shareholders’ 
ability to adopt, when necessary, provisions that give themselves a specified additional power to 
intervene could thus produce benefits in many companies.”); see Stout, supra note 92.  
  
144 MARYLAND LAW REVIEW [VOL. 80:120 
There are four problems with the Agency solution.  First, the agency 
theory doesn’t take into account directors’ motivation to serve the 
corporation and the stakeholders to the best of their ability in order to keep 
their reputation and position.126  Second, as a result of the emphasis on the 
interests of “present-day shareholders,” managers and directors are having 
difficulty with pursuing long-term strategies.127  Third, sometimes the agent 
in a public corporation is the one that has “trouble getting the principal to 
perform her end of the deal.”128  Fourth, there is “fundamental ambiguity” in 
public corporations with regard to which party has control over the other, and 
which party is the one who is contributing the productive inputs.129 
B. Property Rights 
The firm is defined as a “bundle of assets under common ownership,”130 
which has “a contractual structure with: 1) joint input production; 2) several 
input owners; 3) one party who is common to all the contracts of the joint 
inputs; 4) who has rights to renegotiate any input’s contract independently of 
contracts with other input owners; 5) who holds the residual claim; and 6) 
who has the right to sell his central contractual residual status.”131 
According to Blair and Stout, this theory does not distinguish between 
ownership and control of shareholders in a public corporation.132  In reality, 
 
 126. See Stout, supra note 92, at 706 n.66 (“The primary motivation for directors to do their best 
to serve corporate entities may be some combination of the desire to keep the entity healthy so they 
can keep their board positions; the desire to maintain and build their own status and reputations as 
business leaders; and the altruistic desire to benefit the executives, employees, customers, and 
shareholders to whom they may feel a sense of obligation.  History has proven that this imperfect 
set of incentives can be sufficient to allow board-controlled nonprofit and for-profit corporate 
entities to survive and thrive for decades and even centuries, and play major roles in the global 
economy.”); see also Lynn A. Stout, On the Proper Motives of Corporate Directors (Or, Why You 
Don’t Want to Invite Homo Economicus to Join Your Board ), 28 DEL. J. CORP. L. 1, 6 (2003) 
(discussing the effects of the business judgment rule—because of the business judgment rule, 
directors can still shirk their duties and fail to devote adequate time and attention to the corporate 
entity). 
 127. See STOUT, supra note 93, at 7 (“[I]nfluential economic and legal experts are proposing 
alternative theories of the legal structure and economic purpose of public corporations that show 
how a relentless focus on raising the share price of individual firms may be not only misguided, but 
harmful to investors.”).  
 128. See Blair & Stout, supra note 114, at 259. 
 129. Id.  
 130. Id. at 278; see also Sanford J. Grossman & Oliver D. Hart, The Costs and Benefits of 
Ownership: A Theory of Vertical and Lateral Integration, 94 J. POL. ECON. 691, 692 (1986); Oliver 
Hart, An Economist’s Perspective on the Theory of the Firm, 89 COLUM. L. REV. 1757, 1763 n.28 
(1989). 
 131. Armen A. Alchian & Harold Demsetz, Production, Information Costs, and Economic 
Organization, 62 AM. ECON. REV. 777, 794 (1972). 
 132. See Blair & Stout, supra note 114, at 278. 
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the shareholders do not directly control the public corporation.133  
Additionally, it is hard to view the shareholders of public corporations as 
owners of the firm (a bundle of assets), because of the intangible nature of 
the key assets of the public corporation—including intellectual property, 
human-capital, and knowledge.134  It is very hard to put a price on, evaluate, 
and—if need be—sell these intangible assets to a third party in order for the 
shareholders to retrieve any portion of their investment.135  Viewing the 
public corporation as a bundle of assets under common management is 
misleading, according to Blair and Stout.136  Therefore, they propose a 
different approached called “team production.”137 
C. Team Production 
“Team production” proposes to view the public corporation as a “nexus 
of firm-specific investments.”138  According to the team production theory, 
the public corporation should be regarded as a “team of people who enter[ed] 
into a complex arrangement to work together for their mutual gain.”139  The 
public corporation, therefore, is viewed as a team of employees, shareholders, 
and other stakeholders, who contracted to partake in a process of dispute 
resolution and internal goal setting.140  
Directors of public corporations are trustees who take into account the 
interests of all the stakeholders and are regarded as “mediating hierarchs.”141  
Therefore, directors should not solely concentrate on maximizing 
shareholder returns and should instead settle the competing claims of all 
stakeholders.  They are “hired” to “limit shirking and deter rent-seeking 
behavior among team members.”142 
 
 133. Id. 
 134. Id.  
 135. Alchian & Demsetz, supra note 131, at 794.  
 136. See Blair & Stout, supra note 114, at 277.  
 137. See infra Part C.  
 138. See Blair & Stout, supra note 114, at 275 (citation omitted).  
 139. Id. at 278.  
 140. See id.  According to Blair and Stout, stakeholders in a corporation “enter into a ‘pactum 
subjectionis’ under which they yield control over outputs and key inputs (time, intellectual skills, 
or financial capital) to the hierarchy.”  Id. at 278 (citation omitted). 
 141. See id. at 281. 
 142. Id. at 274.  This theory leads to the next theory that was developed by Lynn Stout.  See 
Stout, supra note 92, at 685–86. 
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IV. THE PURPOSE OF THE CORPORATION  
What is the purpose of the corporation?143  There is an old debate over 
the purpose of the corporation.144  This is part of a 1930s Harvard Law 
Review debate between two notable corporate law scholars: Adolfe A. Berle, 
Jr.145 and Merrick E. Dodd.146  This debate about the purpose of the 
corporation includes a dispute about the roles and responsibilities of 
corporate managers and directors and continues to this day.147  The debate 
takes place in the law, labor, finance, and management literatures.  
This question is still very much relevant today because of the dominance 
of Berle’s148 view, which holds that the main purpose of the company is to 
increase its profits, thereby increasing the value of its shares or bonds to the 
benefit of its members or shareholders, so as to increase their financial gains.  
Lynn Stout was one of the prominent legal scholars who called for a radical 
change in the theory and philosophy of current corporate governance 
theory.149   
According to Stout, the rise of shareholder primacy thinking began in 
the 1970s with the rise of the so-called “Chicago School of free-market 
 
 143. Fisch & Solomon, supra note 24.  
 144. Id. at 101.  
 145. See Adolf A. Berle, Jr., For Whom Corporate Managers Are Trustees: A Note, 45 HARV. 
L. REV. 1365 (1932) (arguing in favor of profit as a corporation’s sole purpose).  
 146. See E. Merrick Dodd, Jr., For Whom are Corporate Managers Trustees?, 45 HARV. L. REV. 
1145 (1932) (arguing that a corporation has both profit-making and social service purposes). 
 147. See, e.g., Stephen M. Bainbridge, In Defense of the Shareholder Wealth Maximization 
Norm: A Reply to Professor Green, 50 WASH. & LEE. L. REV. 1423, 1442 (1993) (addressing the 
debate over corporate responsibility set off by the growing prominence of corporations and the 
increasing independent power of managers); Christopher M. Bruner, The Enduring Ambivalence of 
Corporate Law, 59 ALA. L. REV. 1385, 1385–86 (2008) (observing a debate in the contemporary 
corporate governance space); Barnali Choudhury, Serving Two Masters: Incorporating Social 
Responsibility into the Corporate Paradigm, 11 J. BUS. L. 631, 633 (2009) (discussing “the 
ambiguities of corporate law by challenging corporate governance models that favor only one view 
of corporate purpose, and by identifying the differing norms that corporate case law and statutes 
impose”); Ian B. Lee, Corporate Law, Profit Maximization, and the “Responsible” Shareholder, 10 
STAN. J.L. BUS. & FIN. 31, 31 (2005) (exploring the nexus between shareholder ethical 
responsibility and corporate law); Roberta Romano, Less Is More: Making Institutional Investor 
Activism a Valuable Mechanism of Corporate Governance, 18 YALE J. ON REG. 174, 174 (2001) 
(reviewing “corporate finance literature on institutional investors’ activities in corporate governance 
and us[ing] the findings of the empirical literature to inform normative recommendations for the 
proxy process”); Lynn A. Stout, Bad and Not-So-Bad Arguments for Shareholder Primacy, 75 S. 
CAL. L. REV. 1189, 1190 (2002) (suggesting “that we have made at least some intellectual progress 
over the intervening decades on the question of the proper role of the corporation”); Leo E. Strine, 
Jr., Making it Easier for Directors to Do the Right Thing, 4 HARV. BUS. L. REV. 235, 235 (2014) 
(arguing that “benefit corporation statutes have the potential to change the accountability structure 
within which managers operate”).  
 148. See Berle, Jr., supra note 145.  
 149. See e.g., Anat Alon-Beck, The Law of Social Entrepreneurship - Creating Shared Value 
through the Lens of Sandra Day O’Connor’s iCivics, 20 U. PA. J. BUS. L. 520 (2017). 
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economists.”150  The “Chicago School” philosophy is that management 
should focus on and be evaluated based on economic analysis, and that the 
corpoarte purpose or goal is to make shareholders as wealthy as possible.  
Stout further postulated that this idea simplified the overall agency problem 
of large public corporations because corporate performance could be “easily 
measured through the single metric of share price.”151 
For the last twenty years, corporate governance scholars and 
practitioners have been requiring managers of public companies to maximize 
shareholder value by putting emphasis on short-term results.152  
Policymakers, practitioners, and academics alike hold strong views that 
investors’ emphasis on stock market liquidity, which is evidenced by a 
growth in high frequency and algorithmic trading activity and short-term 
holding periods, encourages a focus on short-term results.153  As a result, they 
argue that large public companies are shying away from investing in research 
and development, which requires long-term strategic planning (incorporating 
potential failures) that can affect the price of the company’s stock price.154  
The short-term focus of investors and corporate boards continues to be a 
highly contested issue in the corporate governance debate.155 
Today, this debate continues with different prominent actors, which are 
represented generally by Lucian Bebchuck156 on the one hand, versus Martin 
Lipton157 and Ed Rock158 on the other.  Rock is currently the Reporter 
working on introducing stakeholder elements into the Restatement under the 
American Law Institute Council’s Restatement of Corporate Law project.159  
Rock’s undertaking is extremely important due to the recent pressure placed 
 
 150. STOUT, supra note 93, at 18 .  
 151. Id. at 18–19.    
 152. Stout, supra note 92, at 719.  
 153. See STOUT, supra note 93.  
 154. See STOUT, supra note 93.  
 155. For discussion on shareholder value, see MAYER, supra note 100.  See also Millstein, supra 
note 100 (“[C]orporate boards around the country should re-examine their priorities and figure out 
to whom they owe their fiduciary duties. . . . Some activists are using their newfound power to sway 
and bully management to focus on the short term, meet the quarterly targets and disgorge cash in 
extra dividends or stock buy backs in lieu of investing in long-term growth.”). 
 156. See Bebchuk & Tallarita, supra note 26.  
 157. Martin Lipton, Steven A. Rosenblum & Karessa L. Cain, Thoughts for Boards of Directors 
in 2020, HARV. L. SCH. F. ON CORP. GOVERNANCE (Dec. 10, 2019), 
https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2019/12/10/thoughts-for-boards-of-directors-in-2020/ (discussing 
potential for emergence of stakeholder governance in 2020). 
 158. See Rock, supra note 121.   
 159. Laying Down the Law: Edward Rock Will Oversee Drafting of the First ALI Restatement 
on Corporate Governance, NYU (Apr. 5, 2019), https://www.law.nyu.edu/news/ideas/edward-
rock-ALI-corporate-governance-restatement. 
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on corporate boards and manageres by business leaders, policymakers, 
entrepreneurs, and investors to take stakeholder interests into account.160 
At the same time, certain scholars are advocating for a “third way.”  For 
example, an article by Leo Strine and co-authors calls for “[b]ridging the 
[c]onceptual [d]ivide” between the shareholder and stakeholder theories.161  
Asaf Raz’s purpose-based theory suggests that directors owe their duties 
neither to shareholders, nor to stakeholders.162  Instead, their loyalty is to the 
corporation as a separate legal person.163  When they act, directors have a 
duty to advance the corporation’s purpose.164  That purpose, dictated by state 
corporate law,165 is first to act lawfully: by definition, the corporation is 
legally required to meet all of its obligations to stakeholders.166  Once it has 
done so, the corporation is free to pursue its own profit.167  The corporation 
is free to take stakeholders’ interests into account, even beyond their existing 
legal rights, to the extent this promotes its success and purpose.168 
In order to navigate the unprecedented COVID-19 pandemic, which 
resulted in a global health and financial crisis, there are calls for solidarity, 
mandating cooperation between the public, private, and civic sectors.169  
Businesses and corporate boards around the globe are asked to step up to the 
plate and take healthcare and socio-economic issues into account when 
making decisions.  But, the question remains whether the board can—or 
should, or must—consider the interests of other stakeholders besides 
shareholders.  The following is an explanation of the stakeholder approach.  
A. Understanding the Stakeholder Approach 
There is much debate over “the essence of the board’s fiduciary duty, 
and particularly the extent to which the board can or should or must consider 
the interests of other stakeholders besides shareholders.”170  As noted, since 
 
 160. Alon-Beck, supra note 149.  
 161. William T. Allen, Jack B. Jacobs & Leo E. Strine, Jr., The Great Takeover Debate: A 
Meditation on Bridging the Conceptual Divide, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 1067, 1067 (2002). 
 162. Asaf Raz, A Purpose-Based Theory of Corporate Law, 65 VILL. L. REV. 523, 523 (2020). 
 163. Id. at 529.  
 164. Id.  
 165. See, e.g., Paramount Commc’ns, Inc. v. Time, Inc., 571 A.2d 1140, 1150 (Del. 1989).  
 166. Raz, supra note 162, at 529–30.  
 167. Id. at 538.  However, shareholders only indirectly enjoy the corporation’s profits.  The 
corporation has no duty to make a dividend or buyback at any given time, and should usually operate 
for the long-term in a manner determined by its fiduciaries.  Id.  
 168. Id. at 553.  
 169. See UNITED NATIONS, supra note 8, at 7.  
 170. Martin Lipton, Karessa L. Cain & Kathleen C. Iannone, Stakeholder Governance and the 
Fiduciary Duties of Directors, HARV. L. SCH. F. ON CORP. GOVERNANCE (Aug. 24, 2019), 
https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2019/08/24/stakeholder-governance-and-the-fiduciary-duties-of-
directors/ (emphasis omitted). 
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the end of the twentieth century,171 legal scholars and economists, such as 
Milton Friedman172 and Michael Jensen,173  have been using shareholder 
primacy as a corporate governance model,174 which mandates the 
management of large public firms to maximize managerial opportunism, 
“shareholder (read Wall Street) supremacy,” and short-termism.175  Scholars 
who advocate for “shareholder primacy” focus solely on the shareholders as 
the “sole residual claimants” and “owners” of the corporations, ignoring all 
the other stakeholders.176  They suggest that investors focus on short-term 
results due to their emphasis on stock market liquidity.177  In the words of 
Lynn Stout, “shareholder value thinking had replaced managerialism as the 
dominant business philosophy.”178  
These views are now clashing headfront with the calls for management 
teams and boards to develop business strategies that will encourage long term 
success, taking into account all stakeholders and not merely stockholders.179  
 
 171. See Stout, supra note 92, at 711 (“Toward the end of the twentieth century, however, 
American public companies began to change.  The shift began in academia with the rise of the 
Chicago School of free market economists.  Influential economic thinkers like Milton Friedman and 
Michael Jensen, apparently viewing the public corporation rather like a gigantic sole proprietorship, 
argued that the absence of shareholder power in public companies noted by Berle and Means was a 
problem to be solved rather than a deliberate legal strategy to achieve asset lock-in.”); see also, e.g., 
Hansmann & Kraakman, supra note 92.  
 172. See Friedman, supra note 93; see also STOUT, supra note 93, at 18.  
 173. Jensen & Meckling, supra note 94; see also STOUT, supra note 93.   
 174. See also Hansmann & Kraakman, supra note 95, at 440–41.  
 175. See Greenfield, supra note 23, at 749; see also STOUT, supra note 93, at 712 (maximizing 
“shareholder value” means maximizing the increase of share price and dividends.  “This assumption 
is tantamount to assuming that shareholders act like psychopaths who are indifferent to the 
consequences that their investing decisions impose on others.”); Hansmann & Kraakman, supra 
note 93. 
 176. See Stout, supra note 92, at 711, 711 n.87 (“Rather than owning corporations, shareholders 
own shares, which are a contract with the corporate entity.  Similarly, the corporate entity is its own 
residual claimant.  While the idea of shareholder ‘ownership’ of the firm might be forgiven as a 
convenient and harmless metaphor when describing a company with a controlling shareholder, it is 
grossly misleading when applied to a board-controlled company.”) (citation omitted). 
 177. See STOUT, supra note 93, 693 (“The short-term focus of investors and corporate boards is 
currently one of the key issues in the corporate governance debate.”); MAYER, supra note 100; 
Millstein, supra note 100.  Therefore, it is not surprising that recent empirical research already 
shows that even profitable technology companies these days increasingly prefer to stay private as 
long as possible in order to avoid the pressures of short-term strategies that result from public 
ownership.  See Rival Versions of Capitalism, supra note 100.  
 178. Stout, supra note 92, at 713.  Stout also refers to the work of Edward Rock, who stated that 
“[m]anagers now largely think and act like shareholders.”  Id. (quoting Edward B. Rock, Adapting 
to the New Shareholder-Centric Reality, 161 U. PA. L. REV. 1907, 1988 (2013)). 
 179. The stakeholder approach theory has four main building blocks: corporate planning, 
systems theory, corporate social responsibility, and organizational theory.  See also R. Edward 
Freeman & John McVea, A Stakeholder Approach to Strategic Management 1–7 (Darden Bus. Sch. 
Working Paper No. 01-02, 2001), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=263511 
(“The impetus behind stakeholder management was to try and build a framework that was 
responsive to the concerns of managers who were being buffeted by unprecedented levels of 
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The stakeholder approach defines “stakeholders” as “any group or individual 
who is affected by or can affect the achievement of an organization’s 
objectives.”180  There is an ongoing debate between scholars of the traditional 
view of fiduciary duty,181 who claim that management is responsible for 
protecting the interests of the shareholders,182 and scholars of the stakeholder 
approach, who claim that management is responsible for protecting the 
interest of all stakeholders.183  It should be noted that there is also a 
management stakeholder approach, which is a “strategic management 
process” and not merely a strategic planning process.184  The strategic 
management process allows management to actively design a new direction 
for the firm, which will take into account how the firm can have an effect on 
the environment and on society, in addition to how the environment and 
society possibly will affect the firm. 185 
Even the shareholder primacy guru Michael C. Jensen himself changed 
some of his statements and conceded that, “we cannot maximize the long-
term value of an organization if we ignore or mistreat any important 
constituency.”186  Human capital is a very important constituency because it 
is a valuable intangible asset, on which the success and progress of the 
company depends.  As noted by my co-author, Constance Bagley: 
 
environmental turbulence and change.  Traditional strategy frameworks were neither helping 
managers develop new strategic directions nor were they helping them understand how to create 
new opportunities in the midst of so much change.  As Freeman observed ‘[O]ur current theories 
are inconsistent with both the quantity and kinds of change that are occurring in the business 
environment of the 1980’s. . . . . A new conceptual framework is needed.’  A stakeholder approach 
was a response to this challenge.” (citation omitted)).  
 180. Id. 
 181. See, e.g., Victor Brudney, Contract and Fiduciary Duty in Corporate Law, 38 B.C. L. REV. 
595, 595 (1997). 
 182. See generally OLIVER WILLIAMSON, THE ECONOMIC INSTITUTIONS OF CAPITALISM (1984) 
(“Williamson [1984] used a transaction cost framework to show that shareholders deserved special 
consideration over other stakeholders because of ‘asset specificity.’  He argued that a shareholder’s 
stake was uniquely tied to the success of the firm and would have no residual value should the firm 
fail, unlike, for example, the labor of a worker.”). 
 183. Freeman & McVea, supra note 179, at 16–17 (“Freeman and Evan [1990] have argued, to 
the contrary, that Williamson’s approach to corporate governance can indeed be used to explain all 
stakeholders’ relationships.  Many other stakeholders have stakes that are, to a degree, firm specific.  
Furthermore, shareholders have a more liquid market (the stock market) for exit than most other 
stakeholders.  Thus, asset specificity alone does not grant a prime responsibility towards 
stockholders at the expense of all others.”); see also William M. Evan & R. Edward Freeman, A 
Stakeholder Theory of the Modern Corporation: Kantian Capitalism, in ETHICAL THEORY AND 
BUSINESS 75 (Tom L. Beauchamp & Norman E. Bowie eds., 5th ed. 1993).  
 184. Freeman & McVea, supra note 179, at 9 (“Strategic planning focuses on trying to predict 
the future environment and then independently developing plans for the firm to exploit its 
position.”). 
 185. Id.  
 186. See CONSTANCE E. BAGLEY, MANAGERS AND THE LEGAL ENVIRONMENT: STRATEGIES 
FOR THE 21ST CENTURY 24 (8th ed. 2016). 
  
2020] TIMES THEY ARE A-CHANGIN’ 151 
“Especially during difficult times, we consider it particularly important for 
the board of directors to focus on ensuring the fair treatment of their 
employees, not merely on incentivizing the executives.”187 
Nevertheless, one question remains: How are the board of directors or 
management going to accomplish these goals?  In order to answer this 
question, we must turn to the boundaries of fiduciary duties.  
V. FIDUCIARY DUTY 
“Fiduciary relationships are crucial to any individual in any 
society.  That is because few individuals are self-sufficient and 
fewer, if any, can live alone.” 
Tamar Frankel188 
 It may be possible to “expand” the scope of a director’s existing 
fiduciary duties to include the protection of employee interests.  However, 
this is a suggestion that is open for further analysis and debate in the United 
States.  As a director has an obligation to act according to “the best interests 
of the company,” we can argue that taking employee and stakeholder interests 
into account is in the best interest of the company.189  
How does one become a fiduciary?  In the corporate law context, a 
person becomes a fiduciary by serving as a director or officer.190  To whom 
does a corporate fiduciary’s duties run?  The answer can change depending 
on the state or nation in question.  According to Velasco, in Delaware, “the 
answer is straightforward: it is ultimately to the shareholders alone.”191  In 
 
 187. Anat Alon-Beck, Instead of Panicking Over the Coronavirus, Maybe We Should Start 
Innovating, FORBES (Feb. 28, 2020, 9:58 AM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/anatalonbeck/2020/02 
/28/instead-of-panicking-over-the-coronavirus-maybe-we-should-start-
innovating/?sh=85250d77eaf4. 
 188. Tamar Frankel, The Rise of Fiduciary Law 2 (Boston Univ. Sch. of L., Pub. L. Rsch. Paper 
No. 18-18, 2018), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3237023. 
 189. For more on this line of suggestion, see Jennifer G. Hill, Corporate Governance and the 
Role of the Employee, in PARTNERSHIP AT WORK: THE CHALLENGE OF EMPLOYEE DEMOCRACY 
110 (Paul J. Gollan & Glenn Patmore eds., 2003); see also Fisch & Solomon, supra note 17, at 130.  
 190. See Julian Velasco, Fiduciary Principles in Corporate Law, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK 
OF FIDUCIARY LAW 61 (Evan J. Criddle, Paul B. Miller & Robert H. Sitkoff eds., 2019).  Employees 
and other agents of the corporation are also fiduciaries, but that is more properly understood as an 
aspect of agency law rather than corporate law.  See Deborah A. DeMott, Fiduciary Principles in 
Agency Law, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF FIDUCIARY LAW (Evan J. Criddle et al. eds., 2019); 
Aditi Bagchi, Fiduciary Principles in Employment Law, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF 
FIDUCIARY LAW (Evan J. Criddle et al. eds., 2019).  In addition, shareholders with a controlling 
interest in the corporation may be held to have fiduciary duties.  
 191. See Velasco, supra note 190; Malone v. Brincat, 722 A.2d 5, 9 (Del. 1998) (“The board of 
directors has the legal responsibility to manage the business of a corporation for the benefit of its 
shareholder owners.”); Lawrence A. Hamermesh & Leo E. Strine, Jr., Delaware Corporate 
Fiduciary Law: Searching for the Optimal Balance, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF FIDUCIARY 
LAW (Evan J. Criddle et al. eds., 2019).   
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other states or nations, it is possible that the fiduciary duty will be extended 
more broadly.192  
Fiduciary duty regulates relationships in many legal fields193 and has a 
long history.194  The duty is imposed upon people or organizations in a 
position of trust or confidence in order to deal with agency costs, asymmetric 
information, and conflicts of interest when they exercise “discretionary 
power in the interests of another person.”195 
There is a way to settle the dispute between Dodd and Berle with regard 
to directors in the exercise of their fiduciary duties.  If we take the Berle view, 
which is the dominant view in Delaware, as noted in further detail below, the 
directors or managers can be protected under the business judgment rule as 
long as their decision was informed, in good faith, and for the best interests 
of the company.  Therefore, as long as employee interests are in the best 
interests of the company, the court will abstain from reviewing the merits of 
the decision. 
Directors and officers are fiduciaries.  As fiduciaries, they are trusted 
with managing the firm on behalf of the shareholder (or capital investors).  In 
this relationship, the recipients of the fiduciary services, the capital investors, 
depend on the services provided by the fiduciaries.  The relationship between 
the fiduciaries and the capital investors (shareholders) is asymmetrical.196  
 
 192. See Velasco, supra note 190 (discussing constituency statutes).  
 193. See Frankel, supra note 188.  See generally Elizabeth S. Scott & Ben Chen, Fiduciary 
Principles in Family Law, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF FIDUCIARY LAW 227 (Evan J. Criddle 
et al. eds., 2019); Nina A. Kohn, Fiduciary Principles in Surrogate Decision-Making, in THE 
OXFORD HANDBOOK OF FIDUCIARY LAW 249 (Evan J Criddle et al. eds., 2019); EVAN J. CRIDDLE 
& EVAN FOX-DECENT, FIDUCIARIES OF HUMANITY: HOW INTERNATIONAL LAW CONSTITUTES 
AUTHORITY, chs. 1–7 (2016); DeMott, supra note 190 ; Bagchi, supra note 190; Dana M. Muir, 
Fiduciary Principles in Pension Law, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF FIDUCIARY LAW 167 (Evan 
J. Criddle et al. eds., 2019); Emily L. Sherwin, Formal Elements of Contract and Fiduciary Law, in 
CONTRACT, STATUS, AND FIDUCIARY LAW 167 (Paul B. Miller & Andrew S. Gold eds., 2016); 
Andrew Tuch, Investment Banks as Fiduciaries: Implications for Conflicts of Interest, 29 MELB. U. 
L. REV. 478 (2005); Howell E. Jackson, Regulation in a Multisectored Financial Services Industry: 
An Exploratory Essay, 77 WASH. U. L. Rev. 319 (1999); Julian Velasco, A Defense of the Corporate 
Law Duty of Care, 40 J. CORP. L. 647 (2015); Lloyd Hitoshi Mayer, Fiduciary Principles in 
Charities and Other Nonprofits (Jan. 30, 2018), in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF FIDUCIARY LAW 
(Evan J. Criddle et al. eds., 2019). 
 194. See Frankel, supra note 188, at 2 (“It was recognized in Roman law and the British common 
law and appeared decades ago in religious laws, such as Jewish law, Christian law, and Islamic law.  
Internationally, fiduciary law has a place in European legal system in Chinese law, Japanese law 
and Indian law.”) (citations omitted). 
 195. See UNITED NATIONS ENVIRONMENT PROGRAMME FINANCE INITIATIVE (UNEP FI) & 
PRINCIPLES FOR RESPONSIBLE INVESTMENT (PRI), FIDUCIARY DUTY IN THE 21ST CENTURY: FINAL 
REPORT, https://www.unepfi.org/wordpress/wp-content/uploads/2019/10/Fiduciary-duty-21st-
century-final-report.pdf.  
 196. See generally Jensen & Meckling, supra note 94.  For further discussion on agency 
problems and strategies to reduce them, see also John Armour, Henry Hansmann & Reinier 
Kraakman, Agency Problems and Legal Strategies, in THE ANATOMY OF CORPORATE LAW: A 
  
2020] TIMES THEY ARE A-CHANGIN’ 153 
The shareholders depend on the fiduciaries because they “cannot acquire the 
knowledge and expertise necessary for all the services that all fiduciaries can, 
and do, offer.”197  In return, they reward fiduciaries for their services.  
Fiduciaries acquire power over their investors, as they often have the 
discretion to decide how to invest the funds that investors have invested in 
the firm.198  In many cases, there is an imbalance in the relationship between 
the fiduciary and the beneficiary.  The investors lack the ability to exercise 
oversight (monitoring) over the beneficiary.  They might not possess 
expertise to be able to “fully evaluate and judge the value, quality and 
reliability of services, and whether it satisfies their needs.”199  
Fiduciary duty, therefore, is important to curtail the fiduciary’s power, 
so that it is not “abused and misused, intentionally or negligently.”200  
Moreover, fiduciary duty requires the directors and officers, “who manage 
other people’s money [to] act responsibly in the interests of beneficiaries or 
investors, as opposed to serving their own interests.”201  
Any decision that is a business decision is protected under the business 
judgment rule (“BJR”).  The BJR is a common law defense developed by 
courts and an important concept to understanding fiduciary duty in corporate 
law.  The BJR is (and has been for decades) the most important protection 
against personal liability for directors and officers.202  It allows directors and 
officers in a corporation to take calculated business risks and prevents the 
courts from second-guessing such business decisions.203  
Delaware courts interpret the BJR as “a presumption that in making a 
business decision the directors of a corporation acted on an informed basis, 
in good faith and in the honest belief that the action taken was in the best 
interests of the company.”204  If a fiduciary makes a decision that will benefit 
 
COMPARATIVE AND FUNCTIONAL APPROACH (Reinier H. Kraakman, John Armour, Paul Davies, 
Luca Enriques, Henry Hansmann, Gerard Hertig, Klaus Hopt, Hideki Kanda & Edward Rock. eds., 
2d ed. 2009); George A. Akerlof, The Market for “Lemons”: Quality Uncertainty and the Market 
Mechanism, 83 Q. J. ECON. 488, 493 (1970). 
 197. See Frankel, supra note 188, at 3.  
 198. See UNEP FI & PRI, supra note 195, at 10 (“In practice, these fiduciaries have discretion as 
to how they invest the funds they control.  The scope of that discretion varies.  It may be narrow, 
for example, in the case of tailored mutual funds where the beneficiary specifies the asset profile 
and only the day-to-day stock selection and other management tasks are left to the investment 
decision maker.  It may be wide, as with many occupational pension funds.  Further, some public 
funds are subject to considerable state control and the discretion afforded to these decision makers 
may be further narrowed by parameters set by government.”).  
 199. See Frankel, supra note 188, at 3.  
 200. Id. 
 201. See UNEP FI & PRI, supra note 195, at 10 (“The manner in which these duties are framed 
differs between countries and between common and civil law jurisdictions.”) (citation omitted).  
 202. There is a difference between the Duty of Care and the Duty of Loyalty.  
 203. Velasco, supra note 190.  
 204. Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 812 (Del. 1984).  
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employees as stakeholders, that decision will contribute to the financial 
growth and overall long-term value creation in the company.  Accordingly, 
such a decision should be considered a business decision protected under the 
BJR. 
Therefore, in order to prevent abuse by fiduciaries in the United States, 
courts should adopt the “all things being equal rule.”205  This rule means that 
fiduciaries can and should take employees’ interests into account (as 
stakeholders) in such a way as to “generate collateral benefits, but only if 
such an investment [is] ‘equal to or superior’ in risk, return, and soundness 
to other alternatives.”206  
In order to prevent abuse, there is a need for fiduciaries to be transparent 
about their business decisions and to implement better corporate reporting on 
EESG issues, investment beliefs, long-term mandates, integrated reporting, 
and performance. 
VII. THE PROBLEM OF INADEQUATE MONITORING OF PUBLIC MANAGERS 
There are several theories that deal with the problem of inadequate 
monitoring of public managers, as noted above.  The dominant theory is the 
agency theory, which deals with the shirking behavior of agents.207  Both the 
shareholder and stakeholder theories must deal with the uncertainty 
surrounding the potential opportunistic conduct of the managers.208  
Investors take information risks—the “adverse selection” 
challenge209—into account prior to any engagement with or investment in a 
company.  The investors of public companies are usually apathetic and have 
either a hard time or no desire to acquire information about the portfolio 
company and risks.  That is why there is always a need for disclosure of 
information.  
 
 205. UNEP FI & PRI, supra note 195, at 11 (“In the US, for example, the decision maker’s duty 
is to exercise reasonable care, skill and caution in pursuing an overall investment strategy that 
incorporates risk and return objectives reasonably suitable to the trust.”).  
 206. See Christopher Geczy, Jessica S. Jeffers, David K. Musto & Anne M. Tucker, Institutional 
Investing When Shareholders Are Not Supreme, 5 HARV. BUS. L. REV. 73, 85 (2015); Jayne 
Elizabeth Zanglein, Protecting Retirees While Encouraging Economically Targeted Investments, 5 
KAN. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y, 47, 49 (1996) (“The Department of Labor’s position under the direction 
of Lanoff became known as the ‘all things being equal’ test.”).  
 207. See, e.g., Bengt Holmström, Moral Hazard and Observability, 10 BELL J. ECON. 74, 75 
(1979). 
 208. See also PAUL GOMPERS & JOSH LERNER, THE VENTURE CAPITAL CYCLE 127–31 (1999); 
Manuel A. Utset, Reciprocal Fairness, Strategic Behavior & Venture Survival: A Theory of Venture 
Capital Financed Firms, 2002 WIS. L. REV. 45, 54–55 (2002).  
 209. See Akerlof, supra note 196, at 493 (firms’ offerings of equity may be associated with 
“lemons” problem); see also Utset, supra note 208, at 56; GOMPERS & LERNER, supra note 208, at 
129.  
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According to Jensen and Meckling, the agency problem is a common 
problem and exists in all enterprises and cooperation forms.210  Therefore, it 
is not a unique characteristic of a company that takes shareholders or 
stakeholder interests into account.  
The analysis of the agency theory assumes that the main problem is to 
align the interests of the principal and agent, and to get the agent to follow 
the principal’s orders, without taking into account the agent’s interests.  
Therefore, adopting a strategic stakeholder approach to management 
would not increase the insulation of corporate leaders from shareholders.  
Corporate leaders are already insulated, and it is very difficult today to hold 
them personally accountable for their actions, unless they clearly violate their 
duty of loyalty.  That is why we should require managers that want to take 
stakeholder interests into account to ask their shareholders to either 
incorporate such an obligation in the company’s charter, with a specific 
purpose, or to convert the company to a PBC. 
In his Article, Making It Easier For Directors To “Do The Right 
Thing”?, Justice Strine postulates that the benefit corporation statutes “have 
the potential to change the accountability structure within which managers 
operate.”211  In theory, if adopted, these statutes can mandate that managers 
take stakeholder interests into account and “do the right thing.”212  
Unfortunately, however, it seems that this new form is not that popular for 
the reasons listed below.  As evidenced by the fact that approximately 4,000 
companies have adopted this new form in the United States, including well-
known companies such as Patagonia and Kickstarter.213  
A. The Public Benefit Corporation 
There is a rise in legislation of hybrid corporate forms in the United 
States, where legislators in thirty-five states across the country (and the 
District of Columbia) have enacted some form of innovative social enterprise 
legislation.  Legislators have passed forty-five bills, mirroring current social 
 
 210. See Jensen & Meckling, supra note 94, at 309 (“The problem of inducing an ‘agent’ to 
behave as if he were maximizing the ‘principal’s’ welfare is quite general.  It exists in all 
organizations and in all cooperative efforts—at every level of management in firms, in universities, 
in mutual companies, in cooperatives, in governmental authorities and bureaus, in unions, and in 
relationships normally classified as agency relationships such as are common in the performing arts 
and the market for real estate.  The development of theories to explain the form which agency costs 
take in each of these situations (where the contractual relations differ significantly), and how and 
why they are born will lead to a rich theory of organizations which is now lacking in economics and 
the social sciences generally.”).  
 211. Leo E. Strine, Jr., Making It Easier for Directors to “Do the Right Thing”?, 4 HARV. BUS. 
L. REV. 235, 235 (2014). 
 212. Id.  
 213. See Alon-Beck, supra note 149, at 523. 
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movements.214  “[T]he most common form of social enterprise legislation 
adopted is the benefit corporation legislation.”215  Even Delaware, a state that 
is considered to be pro-management, due to its court decisions and statutes,216 
adopted such a form in 2013—the Public Benefit Corporation (“PBC”).  
Unfortunately, many companies find it hard to adopt this form because there 
is inadequate guidance in Delaware and other states on how managers and 
directors can balance the company’s profit purpose with its public benefit 
purpose.217  There is also uncertainty in the event of litigation over breach of 
fiduciary duties. 
In my article, The Law of Social Entrepreneurship - Creating Shared 
Value through the Lens of Sandra Day O’Connor’s iCivics, I note that social 
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entrepreneurs are dealing with legal uncertainty and capital formation 
difficulties.218  They have to “persuad[e] their potential investors and other 
audiences that they are indeed credible and are leading a social enterprise as 
they claim, which result in inefficiencies in raising capital.  There are 
additional challenges associated with structuring, launching, funding, and 
counseling social enterprises,” which are also discussed in detail in that 
article. 219  
Until we develop agreed-upon metrics for assessment, there will always 
be difficulty associated with measuring value creation and intangible assets 
of public benefit corporations.  There is debate on whether these firms can 
simply be measured by monetary performance or traditional profit creation.  
Instead, they “should be evaluated based on their impact on the public, the 
communities that they serve, the services that they offer, and the various 
products that they create.”220 
Moreover, some will claim that the management of PBCs “cannot 
capture the full social value that was created in an economic form [to] justify 
spending or paying” for the resources used by the firm, even when 
“improvements can be measured and attributed to a given intervention.”221  
That is why social entrepreneurship scholars like Gregory Dees suggest that 
social entrepreneurs should not be concerned with wealth creation, but rather 
with mission-related impact, as “[w]ealth is just a means to an end for social 
entrepreneurs.”222  The question is whether markets have difficulty with 
evaluating social value creation, improvement, and overall public goods.  
Dees claims that markets have difficulty determining whether the resources 
that are used by the social entrepreneur in order to create value actually 
generate sufficient social value to justify their use.223  Edmans also finds that 
equity markets fail to fully incorporate the value of intangible assets, but also 
that employee satisfaction improves overall firm performance.224   
To illustrate, note that Edmans used the list of the “100 Best Companies 
to Work For in America” to measure employee satisfaction, and collected 
data that was available since 1984.225  He also looked at the future stock 
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returns of these companies in order to measure the financial performance.226  
Edmans found that a “value-weighted portfolio of the ‘100 Best Companies 
to Work For in America’ earned an annual four-factor alpha of 3.5% from 
1984 to 2009, and 2.1% above industry benchmarks.”227  Therefore, investors 
should want management to invest in employees and to make sure that the 
employees are satisfied for engagement, retention, and recruitment purposes.  
Below are some suggestions that this Article makes about disclosure of this 
information to investors and the public. 
Perhaps, now that we have these great results, we will see a surge in 
traditional public companies that decide to take stakeholder interests into 
account and convert to PBCs.  As noted above, management should be 
required to disclose a specific purpose if they decide to take stakeholder 
interests into account or convert into a PBC (especially if there is a potential 
conflict of interest).  The following are some examples of established 
companies that already decided to convert to PBCs despite the many 
challenges associated with such a decision. 
Companies that have successfully converted their status range from 
fashion, technology,228 news,229 and banks,230 to crowdfunding platforms.  
For example, Patagonia, a clothing company, was among the first established 
companies that converted to a benefit corporation as soon as the benefit 
corporation legislation was available in California.231  Kickstarter, the 
crowdfunding platform, is also a great example of a Delaware PBC.232   
Perhaps more tech companies will decide to incorporate as a PBC before 
they do an IPO.  Recently, Lemonade Inc., a technology-driven renters’ and 
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homeowners’ insurance startup, was the second PBC to file for an IPO.233  
Lemonade Inc. is incorporated in Delaware, and according to its prospectus, 
is committed for the long-term to “make insurance a public good.”234  Perhaps 
if things go well for Lemonade Inc., other startups will follow.  
Another development is with regard to new legislation that was recently 
passed by the Delaware House of Representatives.  This new legislation, if 
signed into law, will make it easier for a traditional for-profit C-corporation 
to convert to a PBC by eliminating the current 2/3 voting requirements for a 
corporation to amend its certificate of incorporation or merge with another 
entity to become a PBC.235  
The following are suggestions with regard to managing human capital, 
pertaining to public disclosures and agreed-upon metrics for assessments.  
VIII. INFORMATION IS POWER 
“There is … one regulatory sphere that requires a holistic set of 
disclosures for public consumption: the federal securities laws.” 
Ann M. Lipton236  
There is a paradigm shift in the U.S. investment community with regard 
to the desire to understand the management of human capital.  Transparency 
with regard to human capital management is incredibly important for 
business and society—so much so that our regulators, the SEC, are now 
tasked with proposing, drafting, and enforcing new disclosure rules.  
On August 8, 2019, the SEC proposed amendments, pursuant to 
Regulation S-K, “to modernize the description of business (Item 101), legal 
proceedings (Item 103), and risk factor disclosures (Item 105) that registrants 
are required to make . . . .”237  Section 108 of the Jumpstart Our Business 
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Startups Act (the “JOBS Act”) mandates that the SEC’s staff review the 
disclosure requirements in Regulation S-K and issue a report.238  
Prior to and following the announcement by the SEC, investor groups 
have filed comment letters asking the SEC to establish mandatory disclosure 
rules on how public companies manage their human capital, which would be 
both prescriptive and principles-based. 239  The SEC decided against a 
prescriptive disclosure approach and chose to require a principle-based 
approach, which allows “companies to decide for themselves whether their 
human capital is important enough to their business to warrant disclosure.”240  
Unfortunately, as a result of this choice, in practice, public companies will 
probably not provide much insight into how they manage their talent.  
In the new economy, which is a “knowledgeable economy,”241 
employees are incredibly important to the firm, as their knowledge 
contributes to the firm’s intangible assets.242  Tech companies especially rely 
on their human capital to grow and innovate.  Advocacy groups including 
Workforce Disclosure Initiative (“WDI”), The Human Capital Management 
Coalition (“HCMC”), The CFA Institute, JUST Capital, and others 
commented that the SEC should use its mandate and require companies to 
disclose more information to their investors and the public on human capital 
management.243  The following are requests for changes to disclosure rules.  
WDI244 is a project managed by ShareAction,245 which is supported by 
a signatory group of 138 investor signatories with over $14 trillion in assets 
under management.  WDI calls for greater transparency on workforce 
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policies and practices in companies’ direct operations and supply chains.246  
In a comment letter to the SEC, WDI stated: 
[W]e express concern about the principles-based approach which 
would allow companies significant flexibility in the information 
they select for disclosure.  We also raise concerns over the use of 
a subjective materiality threshold for determining disclosure since 
the Commission already requires registrants to report material 
information. Removing the rules based [sic] approach could have 
the effect of reducing the amount of information that is disclosed 
and available to investors.  Given the opportunity, many companies 
continue to exclude certain material human capital topics from 
their public disclosure such as the number of employees and 
turnover.  It is therefore problematic to rely on a registrant’s 
management to evaluate the significance of this information given 
the current poor state of disclosure on human capital topics.247 
HCMC is a “cooperative effort among a diverse group of influential 
institutional investors to further elevate human capital management as a 
critical component in company performance . . . . The HCMC is led by the 
UAW Retiree Medical Benefits Trust and includes 30 institutional investors 
representing over $5.9 trillion in assets.”248  In a comment letter to the SEC, 
HCMC stated: 
[P]erformance on certain human capital metrics are material to 
investors across all companies.  Materiality is defined by reference 
to what a reasonable shareholder would consider important in 
deciding how to invest or vote.  A broad range of investors have 
identified certain human capital-related information as likely to 
influence their decision making [sic], and a substantial majority of 
the comments submitted on the Petition supported some degree of 
standardized, comparable disclosures across all companies.  The 
HCMC believes that consistency and comparability in reporting 
promotes efficiency both for issuers who would have concrete 
guidance on what to report and how, and for investors who would 
no longer need to pore through reams of documents to find basic 
information on the workforce.  It allows investors to easily and 
efficiently compare companies and benchmark performance.  It 
also levels the playing field between large institutional investors 
who can demand (and afford) more data from companies on human 
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capital, and smaller retail investors who, on a practical basis, often 
cannot.249  
The Center for American Progress further advocates for changes to our 
accounting rules, as follows: 
Companies’ expenditures on worker training and skills show up 
not as a valuable investment similar to R&D but as an increase in 
general overhead, a measure that managers have shown a proclivity 
for cutting and whose reduction is often cheered by investors.  This 
treatment of human capital ignores the findings of numerous 
studies: Investments in human capital enhance productivity and are 
more valuable to a firm than general overhead expenses.250 
Leo Strine, former Chief Justice of the Delaware Supreme Court, has 
joined these calls for greater recognition of human capital investments.251  
Strine offers several great proposals, including new accounting rules that will 
treat corporate investments in the workforce as capital expenditures.252  Strine 
also calls on public companies to set up board committees that will be focused 
on the welfare of the workforce.253  Strine’s suggestions are all welcome.  
Former SEC Commissioner Robert Jackson and current SEC 
Commissioner Allison Lee also expressed their concerns about the shift to a 
principles-based disclosure approach, in a published joint statement.  They 
stated: 
One concern with principles-based disclosure is that it gives 
company executives discretion over what they tell investors.  
Another is that it can produce inconsistent information that 
investors cannot easily compare, making investment analysis—
and, thus, capital—more expensive.  Our concern is that the 
proposal’s principles-based approach will fail to give American 
investors the information they need about the companies they 
own.254 
This Article joins the call for change.  By selecting a principles-based 
disclosure regime, the SEC failed to take meaningful steps to improve access 
for investors and employees to information regarding human capital 
management, efforts, and results.  The SEC should move to a prescriptive 
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approach (a specific line-item requirement) and require public companies to 
disclose information on various topics, including the following: (1) 
workforce composition (including workforce demographics255 on hiring, 
promotion, compensation and incentives,256 layoffs, furloughs, other 
employment policies and practices) broken down by major job categories; (2) 
information with regard to layoffs and furloughs (additional information on 
demographics of employees, such as rehires, training, healthcare and other 
benefits); (3) information on training, skill building, and capabilities;257 and 
(4) information on healthcare coverage and best practices to ensure employee 
health, safety, and well-being during the pandemic.  
Disclosures will help investors understand how management makes 
decisions on human capital and culture.  Management should disclose the 
metrics that they use in order to make hiring, retention, training, and firing 
decisions.  Disclosures will also help talent—the employees—bargain with 
the firm.  Currently, the reality is that employees do not have formal 
representation in the governance of the firm and do not possess sufficient 
information on the practices of their employers to negotiate their contracts 
with the firm.258  Lack of representation and lack of access to information 
contribute to the systemic problem of lack of diversity amongst the largest 
employers in our nation.   
As noted above, although both labor and capital contribute to the firm, 
only capital gets to decide on how the firm is to be governed.  Now, even 
capital investors demand to have information on human capital management 
of public firms.259  Now, more than ever, management and directors need to 
step up, disclose information on their employment practices, take care of their 
employees, make sure that their interests are represented in governance 
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decisions, and “integrat[e] human capital considerations into the overarching 
strategy to create long-term value.”260  As noted in my Forbes op-ed article 
with Constance E. Bagley: “Once the COVID pandemic is contained and 
firms go back to fighting to attract and keep the best workers, individuals will 
remember (and easily share on social media) which firms lent a hand and 
which only took care of the folks at the top.”261 
IX. CONCLUSION 
This Article also joins the call for a return to a basic “managerialism” 
philosophy.262  Managers of public corporations nowadays cannot 
realistically claim that they are pursuing long-term projects, such as taking 
employee interests into account, without disclosing information on these 
issues to investors and the public.  Therefore, the current disclosure regime 
must change to a prescriptive-based disclosure regime, which will improve 
access to information.  The move to a prescriptive approach will compel 
directors (or management) to seriously take into account the interests of their 
employees and not simply use a public statement as a PR move.  
There is a need for bright-line rules, such as agreed-upon metrics for 
assessment, or a requirement that all public companies disclose the same type 
of information with regard to investment in human capital and culture.  We 
cannot leave it up to management to determine whether disclosure on human 
capital is required and under which circumstances.  
Human capital disclosure requirements would encourage managers and 
directors to take employee interests into account.  This suggestion would 
grow the economy, encourage innovation, and benefit the firm, its 
shareholders, and its stakeholders.  Nevertheless, it has limitations. 
There is no one-model-fits-all format.  It should be recognized that 
managers (or directors) can run into problems given geopolitical realities, as 
well as developments at the local, state, federal, and international levels, 
which can confound these relations.. 
Also, legal scholars will continue to rewrite, reinterpret, and think about 
the stakeholder versus shareholder models, and the purpose of the 
corporation.  However, using this modest suggestion and its variants would 
develop into a new high-bar standard for expanding strategic and sustained 
economic growth of the companies involved, by encouraging innovation and 
development for generations to come. 
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In the meanwhile, the SEC can and should intervene in the market and 
alleviate the lack of mandatory reporting and access to information, which 
also contribute to the systemic problem of lack of diversity amongst the 
largest employers in our nation.  Our securities laws can require public 
companies to disclose information relating to their human capital practices 
as suggested above.  Furthermore, such reports must be made mandatory and 
not left to the discretion of the companies. 
